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NUMBER I

APPELLATE COURTS AND PREJUDICED VERDICTS
Thomas L. Shaffer*
Professor Shaffer maintains that the preservation of fair trial in civil cases
requires an increased Bench and Bar effort to control prejudicial trial
conduct. To support this assertion, he investigates sources of jury prejudice, available and proposed court devices for -emedying inadvertent
and intentional misconduct by trial attorneys, and appellate court avoidance of corrective sanctions.

The whole setup of our democratic government assumes that the
citizen is bright, honest and at least as fundamentally sound as a
common stock.
-E. B. White"
.F'fHE jury has its origins in a system of justice imposed by a foreign
conqueror as a means for determining local custom and questions
of fact put to it by litigants. 2 It has become, though, a democratic institution, and there can now be applied to it the assumptions of brightness, lonesty and fundamental soundness. It is and always has been a
panel of citizens who are asked to decide a question which the sworn
ministers of justice are for some reason unable or unwilling to answer.
The only limitation on these citizens is that they reach their decision
on a basis that is as fair as possible and will appear fair to the litigants,
and-perhaps more significantly-to the citizenry at large. This limitation explains the exclusion of evidence, a complicated process designed
to hide facts, and influences not quite factual, which might cause juries
to reach, or cause the citizenry to believe they have reached, an unfair
decision. "Thinking is, or ought to be, a coolness and a calmness,"
Captain Ahab said, "and
our poor hearts throb, and our poor brains
3
beat too much for that."

I

* Assistant Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; B.A., College of St. Joseph, N.M.;
LL.B., Notre Dame.
1. Tnm SECOND TRE FROM THE CoRNm 123-24 (1953).
2. 1 POLLOCK AND MArrs.AND, THE HrsTORy OF ENGISH LAw 138-50 (2d ed. 1898).
3. ME.ILsv
, MOBY Dxc 806-07 (Mod. Lib. ed.).
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To preserve fairness, and the impression of fairness, is the function
of appellate judges faced with the contention that the judgment of the
trial court is vitiated by a prejudiced verdict. Yet the system has never
allowed the appellant to demonstrate by evidence or reasonably factual
inference that the jurors were prejudiced; it has allowed him, at most,
to show that occurrences during trial were the kind that might have
prejudiced ordinary citizens. Only in the last decade has a noticeable
and thorough effort been made to examine empirically the influence
of prejudice on the juror's mind, and this has been an academic effort;
its methods and results have not reached appellate courts. "We have
secrets here," as Madame Epanchin said, "nothing but secrets. It has
'4
to be so, it's sort of etiquette."
The purpose of this article is an examination of the treatment given
in appellate courts to the argument that juries have been prejudiced
by facts that are supposed to be secrets, and by arguments that are
supposed to be hidden behind "the curtain of a decent silence." 5 The
article analyzes appellate attitudes primarily in terms of the most
recent cases. Only occasionally is reference made to the empirical evidence now being amassed in the University of Chicago's jury project."
The first part of the article will examine the sources of jury prejudice,
as they appear in appellate argument, rather than in empirical analysis,
with particular emphasis on the effect of information about liability
insurance and the effect of illegitimate information introduced into
the trial by innuendo. The second part of the article will examine the
shields to avoid reversal that appellate judges have erected around
themselves-termed herein their "escape valves"-in order to avoid
making a decision involving a measurement of prejudice which they
tacitly acknowledge to be an impossible task. The third section investigates the range of accepted solutions for the problem of prejudiced
juries (including devices which are useful before and during trial, as
well as those reasonably available to appellate courts), and considers
the discipline of the Bar as a final avenue of cure.
4. DosroEvsKy, THE IDioT 77 (Macmillan ed. 1954).
5. MAUGHAM, THE MOON AND SXPENCE 18 (Mod. Lib. ed.).
6. The material which has been published and which is most pertinent to the present
subject is in Kalven, Report on the Jury Project, AIMs AND MErHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH
155, 168-82 (Conard ed. 1955), and in Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project,
38 NEm. L. REv. 744 (1959). The general literature is in those articles and in Kalven, The
Jury, the Law, and the PersonalInjury Damage Award, 19 OIo ST. L.J. 158 (1958), reprinted at 7 U. CHI. LAw SCHOOL RECORD 6 (1958). Professor Kalven's 1955 report and
Professor Broeder's report will be hereinafter cited as "Kalven" and "Broeder" respectively.
The writer makes no claim to having developed this subject either historically or empirically. The present approach is as functional as analysis will permit and is confined,
as nearly as orderly discussion will permit, to recent authority.

APPELLATE COURTS AND PREJUDICED VERDICTS

I. THE ENGINES OF PREJUDICE
The irrelevancies and passions which inject prejudice into a jury
trial are as numerous as the fears and passions of the citizens who sit
on juries; the engines of prejudice run not only on ordinary biased
attitudes, but also on the fact that the juror is a citizen out of his
element; "when one is alone in a strange place, one does not easily
imagine innocent things." 7 The most prevalent prejudicial device is
the suggestion-rarely the proof, because the trial judge will not allow
that-of an irrelevant fact.8 The fact that the defendant carries liability
insurance is an example; or the fact that the plaintiff's employer provides workmen's compensation insurance and that therefore there is
an insuror waiting to take part of the plaintiff's award in reimbursement; or the fact that one of the litigants is a widow or a poor man
with dependents to support. 9 The insertion into the record of the fact
of liability insurance-the disclosure of the hidden litigant-is so com-

mon and so typical of other attempts at jury prejudice that it merits
an extensive foray into the circumstances under which this fact comes
before juries and the attempts of trial and appellate judges to do some1°
thing about it.
The means used for introducing prejudice, as distinguished from
the substance producing the prejudice, are as varied as the ingenuity
of lawyers and the confines of conscience will permit."1 Prejudice may
be introduced through a casual aside, or a whisper during recess, or
well-rehearsed spontaneity from witnesses-remarks made so quickly
that objection is impossible. Appellate courts are aware of most of the
devices, and seem alert to recognize the growth of new ones, An ex1
ample of this awareness is the recent appellate treatment of prejudice
which seeps by innuendo into a record a little at a time; a new trial is
sometimes justified, these cases hold, even though no single instance
seems rabid enough to have infected the verdict. It is useful to give
7. KR TcH, THE BEST OF Two Wopjas 28 (1950).

8. "Irrelevant" is used here in Professor Thayer's sense. This means that irrelevancy
arises either because of factual irrelevancy or because of a rule of policy. See THAYER,
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVmENCE 263-76, 530 (1898); Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy-A Conflict in Theory, 5 VANI. L. Rxv. 385 (1952).

9. Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 39 IlL. App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1963); Brabeck
v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 264 Minn. 160, 117 N.W.2d 921 (1962), 12 DEFENSE L.J. 228 (1963).
See Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451 (1880); McCarthy v. Spring Valley Coal Co., 232
I1. 473, 83 N.E. 957 (1908); Jones & Adams Co. v. George, 227 Ill.
64, 81 N.E. 4 (1907);
Falcon v. LaRoche, 4 I1. App. 2d 112, 123 N.E.2d 587 (1954).
10. Prejudice can also come before the jury in argument, of course. See, e.g., Jacobson
v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 32 Ill. App. 2d 37, 176 N.E.2d 551 (1961).
11. Bulleri v. Chicago Transit Authority, 41 IlL. App. 2d 95, 190 N.E.2d 476 (1963), provides a representative array.
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this new trend separate treatment. This is accomplished here by considering in some detail a 1963 unpublished opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court.
A. Insurance
Somewhere in the dim origins of the action on the case, a canny
businessman perceived profit in insuring a man against the risk of a
damage judgment (and, somewhat later, he discovered it would stimulate his business if state legislatures required potential tortfeasors, in
fact or in effect, to carry liability insurance). At about the same time
appellate courts began to fear that jurors favor plaintiffs when determining liability and give larger awards when they know, or think, that
the defendant himself will not have to pay the plaintiff. An exclusionary rule of evidence was developed to prevent jurors from finding the
hidden litigant. The garden of personal injury litigation was near full
flower when the plaintiff's lawyer, faced with the happy circumstance
of an insurer to pay his client's judgment, and an unhappy rule of evidence barring the mention of this to juries, began to devise new ways
to let juries know about the defendant's insurance.
The hidden litigant is usually a liability insurer. But he may be
insuring against property loss or injury suffered by the plaintiff, and
that fact causes juries to lower awards.' 2 He may be a workmen's compensation insurer paid by the plaintiff's employer, with a right to recover some or all of the plaintiff's judgment.' 3 The rules of evidence
universally exclude identification of any one of these; insurance is
irrelevant in the factual sense and prejudicially irrelevant in Professor
Thayer's sense.' 4 Still lawyers arrayed more or less against the insurer's
interest have discovered that casual asides, whispers to opponents, 5
questions on voir dire examination,' 6 and suggestions that the parties
are really friends17 or relatives' 8 (and thus not hostile at all) avoid the
effect of the exclusionary rule. Almost any device holds some promise.
As the Iowa court once put it:
12. Brown v. McCuan, 56 Cal. App. 2d 35, 132 P.2d 838 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942); Seminole
Shell Co. v. Clearwater Flying Co., 156 So. 2d 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Neill v. McGinn, 175 Neb. 369, 122 N.W.2d 65 (1963).
13. Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 375 U.S. 34 (1963); Berryman v. Bayshore Constr.
Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 207 Cal. App. 2d 331 (1962); Nappi v. Falcon
Truck Renting Corp., 286 App. Div. 123, 141 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1955), aff'd mem., 1 N.Y.2d
750, 152 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1956).
14. See note 6 supra.
15. Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa 114, 21 N.W.2d 311 (1946).
16. MCCORMICK, EVIENCE 356-57 (1954). (Hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK.)
17. Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (rex. 1963).
18. Brown v. Parker, 375 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
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[A juror] . ..is just as keen mentally, just as sound and sensible,
just as honest as a juror as he was and is as a citizen. He doesn't
require a brick house to fall on him to give him an idea. 19
And he doesn't require proof to give him a wealthy defendant. Every
trial lawyer knows this; illegitimate information on insurance is doubtless the most fertile source of jury prejudice.
The early judicial reaction was to treat any mention of insurance as
fatally prejudicial, whether or not there had been objection and
whether or not a therapeutic instruction was given. This was true even
of questions on voir dire to discover whether any of the jurors had interests in or sympathies for casualty companies (on the doubtful premise that the questions were aimed at discovering pro-defendant jurors
and not at informing the jurors that there was insurance in the case2 °).
But early realism had to yield before the fact that personal injury litigation would put the courts out of business if every mention of insurance
automatically required a mistrial. The modem result is an uneasy compromise-the lawyer out to tear the veil from the hidden litigant can
suggest a little, but not very much. He can, for instance, ask the "usual
questions" on voir dire examination, provided his line of questions
"develops in a natural manner and without undue emphasis." 21 He
may even be able to pursue the subject until his opponent, or the trial
judge, stops him.22 And he may be .able to go into the subject more
thoroughly if he wants to assume the risk that the trial judge may grant
a motion for a defendant's instruction which will leave the jurors
completely confused:
The only way the suit can be tried is, as a suit between individuals,
and you. .. must understand that these are the parties in dispute
23
and no one else is involved in the suit.
If he is willing to take a somewhat larger risk of reversal, he can flirt
with insurance until his opponent complains so loudly that the appellate court will attribute jury prejudice to the complaint rather than to
the questions which provoked it.24
19. Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa 114, 132, 21 N.W.2d 311, 320 (1946) (opinion of Bliss, J.).
20. Swift v. Wimberly, 370 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. 1963); see White v. Standard Oil Co., 116
Ohio App. 212, 187 N.E.2d 504 (1962); Kelly v. Great No. Ry., 59 Wash. 2d 894, 371 P.2d

528 (1962).
21. Bunch v. Crader, 369 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); see Copiah Dairies, Inc. v.
Addkison, 153 So. 2d 689 (Miss. 1963); Brown v. Parker, 375 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. C. App.

1964).
22. Woods v. Meacham, 46 Tenn. App. 711, 333 S.W.2d 567 (1959).
23. Swift v. Wimberly, 370 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963) (quoting the trial
transcript).
24. Santee v. Haggart Constr. Co., 202 Minn. 361, 278 N.W. 520 (1938). But see Yoast

v. Sims, 122 Okla. 200, 253 Pac. 504 (1927).
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Modern courts appear to consider inadvertent or casual mention of
insurance-and this includes the "usual questions" on voir dire, which
are neither inadvertent nor casual-as harmless. 25 Although some of
the older cases treat any mention of insurance as fatal,26 modem judges
either assume that the mention is probably not prejudicial, 27 or place
on the appellant the burden of demonstrating that it was prejudicial. 28
Some courts moderate the early rigor by apparently finding fatal prejudice where there is some indication in the record that the jury heard
and understood the allusion to insurance. For instance, references to an
adjuster in questions to witnesses have by dint of repetition been held
to be enough to inform the jury that the defendant was insured. 29
The prevalent attitude in the modem cases has been to abandon
the early no-mention-at-all rule and reverse only if there is more in
the record than bare information to the jury. The cases generally fall
into one of two categories, those which reverse when insurance was
repeatedly mentioned, and those which reverse upon finding in the
record (usually in the verdict) some clear indication of jury prejudice
which can be related to the knowledge of insurance. Guardado v.
Navarro, a recent Illinois appellate opinion, illustrates the first category. "[T]he matter was dwelt upon unduly," the court said, "for the
apparent purpose of gaining a prejudicial advantage."' 0 The South
Dakota court once heard the lawyer for a plaintiff-appellee say that he
repeatedly referred to insurance simply to advise the jury that he did
not, on that account, want them to increase their verdict. If that were
true, the court said, "it is difficult to understand just why he was so
continually calling the jury's attention to the fact." 31 The no-repeatedreferences standard, besides its tacit assumption that the average juror
will not get an idea until a brick house falls on him, encourages the
worst kind of by-play during trial. 2 But it keeps good company; the
25. Moniz v. Bettencourt, 24 Cal. App. 2d 718, 76 P.2d 535 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938).
26. Coe v. Van Why, 33 Colo. 315, 80 Pac. 894 (1905); Martin v. Lilly, 188 Ind. 139, 121
N.E. 443 (1919); Chernick v. Independent Am. Ice Cream Co., 66 .Misc. 177, 121 N.Y.
Supp. 352 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Bacon v. Wass, 200 Okla. 581, 198 P.2d 423 (1948); Yoast v. Sims,
122 Okla. 200, 253 Pac. 504 (1927); Coon v. Manley, 196 S.W. 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
27. Muehlebach v. Mercer Mortuary & Chapel, Inc., 93 Ariz. 60, 378 P.2d 741 (1963),
adopting the holding of Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App. 2d 269, 330 P.2d 468 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1958); see MCCORMICK 356-57.
28. Waid v. Bergschneider, 94 Ariz. 21, 381 P.2d 568 (1963).
29. William Cameron Co. v. Downing, 147 S.W.2d 963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); cf. Skeeters
v. Skeeters, 389 P.2d 313 (Ore. 1964).
30. 47 Ill. App. 2d 92, -, 197 N.E.2d 469, 474 (1964). See also Altenbaumer v. Lion Oil
Co., 186 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
31. Kloppenburg v. Kloppenburg, 66 S.D. 174, 176, 280 N.W. 209, 210 (1938).
32. Martin v. Pacific Gas &:Elec. Co., 204 Cal. App. 2d 316, 22 Cal. Rptr. 291 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1962); Seals v. Sharp, 31 Tenn. App. 75, 212 S.W.2d 620 (1948).
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Supreme Court's recent reversal in Tipton v. Socony Mobile Oil Co. 3
is apparently attributable to the fact that workmen's compensation insurance was mentioned repeatedly in the trial; the repetition required
disagreement with the court of appeals' finding of harmless error.
The second substitute for the no-mention-at-all standard is a
principle that insurance information justifies reversal only where prejudice is apparent. If the court can conclude reasonably that the result
would have been the same had there been no mention of insurance,
it affirms despite the corrupted record.8 4 If the liability issue was close,
and there are other indications that insurance influenced the result,
it reverses.8 5 In Skeeters v. Skeeters,8 6 for instance, the Oregon court
had before it two kinds of insurance, accident insurance covering the
plaintiff, and liability insurance covering the defendant. Only one insurer was hidden; the fact of accident insurance had been pleaded in
answer and was proved in evidence. With one insurer clearly in the
case, the court plausibly concluded that ominous, general questions
about insurance (e.g., "Do you feel that an insurance representative, in
dealing with the party who is insured, should be honest and tell the
truth in their dealings?") were not enough to inform the jury of
liability insurance. Prejudice was unlikely-a conclusion which appears
in a number of appellate opinions in this area. 7
The discovery of prejudice at the trial stage by the appellate court
in its remote sanctuary is an approximate science. The most popular
method is an examination of the verdict, but the relation between
illegitimate information and the verdict is not always conclusive. The
Alabama court, for instance, had before it a plaintiff's lawyer who had
asked a witness about the defendant's $10,000 worth of insurance. The
jury had returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $10,000, but the
court thought it would have to indulge in "mindreading or some other
mystical medium"38 before it could say that the question produced the
33. Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 375 U.S. 34 (1963), reversing 315 F.2d 660 (5th Cir.
1968).
34. Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa 114, 21 N.W.2d 311 (1946); Hager v. Bushman, 255 App.
Div. 934, 8 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1938), rehearing denied, 10 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1939); Halepeska v.
Callihan Interests, Inc., 871 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
35. Messinger v. Karg, 48 Ohio App. 244, 192 N.E. 864 (1934); the court was heavily
influenced by the fact that the case had been tried once before with an opposite verdict.
36. 389 P.2d 313 (Ore. 1964).
37. Authorities cited notes 27 and 28 supra; Jones v. Cary, 219 Ind. 268, 37 N.E.2d 944
(1941); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 792-98, 821 (1949); Walker, The Problem of Indemnity Insurance in Damage Actions as Answered by the Courts of California, 11 So. CAL. L. REV.
407 (1938).
38. Burnett v. Bledsoe, 159 So. 2d 841, 843 (Ala. 1964). Compare Colquett v. Williams,
264 Ala. 214, 222, 86 So. 2d 381, 388 (1956), where the same court said:
[N]either retraction nor rebuke would have destroyed the strongly prejudicial sug-
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verdict. Other courts, on much less convincing indications of prejudice,
would have reversed.39 An occasional record presents indications other
than the verdict that the jury did not appear to have been influenced
by the fact of insurance. In Galotti v. Deansboro Supply Co., the jury
requested that certain portions of the testimony be re-read to them,
and the New York court thought this proof enough "that the jury

were giving serious consideration to the merits of the case." 40 Of course,
reliance on appearance may be dangerous. If the average juror can
detect insurance in the case without a brick house falling on him, he
may also be able to reason that he had best play the game and not
mention what cannot be mentioned to him, nor even appear to have
thought about it.41
Some of the authority on illegitimate insurance information holds
that no amount of therapy can cure the prejudice. 42 This is a sample

of historic realism that has broken under the weight of personal injury
44
litigation,4 3 although the principle still survives in a few opinions.
Others, which hold that the trial judge's failure to instruct was re45
versibly erroneous, reject it by negative inference.
The Skeeters opinion indicated that the fact of insurance is not prejudicial if it comes into the trial legitimately, e.g., where an insurer is
a party.46 If admissible evidence unavoidably indicates that an insurer
is a hidden litigant in the case, the disclosure will not render the
evidence inadmissible.47 If the party interested in keeping the litigant
gestions that it was an insurance company and not appellants who should and
would have to pay for appellee's injuries.
39. Indian Ref. Co. v. Crain, 280 Ky. 112, 132 S.W.2d 750 (1939); Messinger v. Karg,
48 Ohio App. 244, 192 N.E. 864 (1934). The standards are similar to those applied in cases
where affirming the damage verdict is conditioned on accepting a reduced amount. See
James, Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts, 1 DUQUESNE L. REV. 143
(1963).
40. 248 App. Div. 20, 24, 289 N.Y. Supp. 535, 540 (1936).
41. See Broeder, supra note 6, which indicates that, although jurors consider liability
insurance, and award higher damage verdicts when they know about it, they observe the
court's instruction not to talk about it in the jury room. An interesting and unscientific
report on the same subject is Amandes, From Voir Dire to Verdict Through a juror's
Eyes, 9 PPAc. LAW. 21 (No. 6, 1963), but Professor Amandes appears not to have considered
the possibility that jurors depart from instructions without appearing to do so.
42. Colquett v. Williams, 264 Ala. 214, 86 So. 2d 381 (1956); Davis v. F. M. Stamper Co.,
347 Mo. 761, 148 S.W.2d 765 (1941).
48. Jones v. Cary, 219 Ind. 268, 37 N.E.2d 944 (1941); Marshall v. Meade, 23 Misc. 2d
162, 201 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
44. Colquett v. Williams, 264 Ala. 214, 86 So. 2d 381 (1956). But see Burnett v. Bledsoe,
159 So. 2d 841 (Ala. 1964).
45. Davis v. F. M. Stamper Co., 347 Mo. 761, 148 S.W.2d 765 (1941).
46. Price v. King, 122 N.W.2d 318 (Iowa 1963).
47. Berryman v. Bayshore Constr. Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) aff'd, 207
Cal. App. 2d 331; Gigliotti v. United Illuminating Co., 193 A.2d 718 (Conn. 1963); Lilly v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 318 Pa. 248, 177 At. 779 (1935); McCoRmiCK at 356; Annot., 94
A.L.R.2d 826, 833-41 (1964).
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hidden first suggests insurance-typically in questions on a statement
given by one of the parties to an insurance adjuster-the other party
is entitled to explore the subject, even though the exploration tears
the veil of obscurity from an insurance company.48 Finally, if both
parties have suggested insurance, a general principle of invited prejudice will operate to estop either from complaining about a prejudiced
verdict.4 9
The problem of hiding liability insurers has produced, from impressive scholars of evidence, at least three policy approaches:
1. The "open it up" school, led by the late Professor Charles McCormick, who accurately predicted, in 1938, that "hard rules of exclusion will soften into standards of discretion to exclude," 50 just as hard
rules of reversal- for misconduct have softened into rules which only
permit reversals for prejudice. He takes the position in his popular
treatise on evidence that jurors in modern trials assume that the defendant is protected by liability insurance and that mention of it is
probably harmless:
The truth will out, and the results are extensive arguments on
appeal upon elusive questions of prejudice and good faith, and a
considerable number of reversals and retrials. The heart of the
policy of non-disclosure is really surrendered when the jurors are
allowed to be examined upon their connection with insurance
companies."'
2
Whatever merit this school of thought has, and it has its supporters,
it appears not to have considered the fact that the typical these-are-theonly-parties trial court instruction, 5 or the same confusion introduced
in the defendant's voir dire questions, may reverse in the jurors' minds
the assumption that the defendant is insured. The "open it up" argument, in any event, is little help to trial judges, who must live with
the appellate rules on the subject.
48. Wills v. J. J. Newberry Co., 43 Cal. App. 2d 595, 111 P.2d 346 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941);
Kickels v. Fein, 104 Ind. App. 606, 10 N.E.2d 297 (1937); Neill v. McGinn, 175 Neb. 569,

122 N.W.2d 65 (1963); Stygles v. Ellis, 123 N.W.2d 348 (S.D. 1963) (and cases cited by the
South Dakota court).
49. See the discussion of invited prejudice in Part II,infra.
50. McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.AJ. 507, 580 (1938).
51. McCoRMICK 358.

52. Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App. 2d 269, 330 P.2d 468 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
53. Miller v. Alvey, 194 N.E.2d 747, 749 (Ind.App. Ct. 1963), involved this instruction:
You are instructed that Katherine Miller and Herman Miller are the only plaintiffs
and Russell Alvey is the only defendant in this cause of action, and there is no evidence in this case there is any other party, plaintiff or defendant, interested in its
outcome.
The appellate court held the instruction justified because mention of insurance had been
made and -there had been introduced into evidence a release agreement negotiated by an
insurance adjuster.
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2. The .neo-hush-hush school (to update Professor McCormick's
phrase 54), which attempts to accommodate the earliest judicial responses
on this question to the demands of modern trial dockets. This policy
position requires that trial judges do all they can to minimize the
effect of mentions of insurance and avoid any comments, or even therapeutic instructions, which might "magnify the matter and perhaps lead
the jurors to believe that insurance is a material consideration." 55
Judge William Bliss' brick house remark 56 is a witty expression of this
point of view. Even though the judge does everything he can to keep
the hidden litigant behind the veil that law provides him, he cannot
in all cases keep the influence of insurance from reaching the juryunless he is willing to give an instruction which implies that, despite
voir dire questions and casual suggestions from the plaintiff's lawyer,
the defendant really is not insured.
3. The "explain it away" school, represented by the late Dean
Wigmore. "Any one who will study the opinions of Supreme Courts,"
he wrote, "can satisfy himself that the permission to the trial judge
to express his opinion on matters of evidence would remove a large
part of the supposed harm done by trifling transgressions of the rules
of Evidence, and would thus remove much of the abuse of new trials."
He gives a convincing example:
A policeman, on a murder trial, telling about the bloody hatchet
he found, is asked, "Was it human blood?" and the answer gets in.
"Yes, it looked to me like human blood."
Instead of ordering a new trial because the jury might give to
this layman's guess a value which it does not have, why not let the
trial judge say to the jury in his charge: "You need not pay any
attention, gentlemen, to the policeman's notion about the blood
being human. He knows nothing about the difference between
different kinds of blood. He is no expert in blood. You heard
chemists here, on both sides, testify from their analyses and give
their reasons and scientific processes. Decide5 7from their testimony.
Do not mind what the policeman thought."
Dean Wigmore chose his example carefully; this fatherly advice would
have less effect in a case involving insurance, because here the policy
of the law is to keep from the jurors' knowledge a probative, influen54. MCCORMICK 357.
55. Dennis v. Hulse, 362 S.W.2d 308, 309 (rex. 1962); see Smith v. St. Lawrence County
Nat'1 Bank, 18 App. Div. 2d 1042, 238 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1963); Verdi v. Saporita, 34 Misc. 2d
10, 226 N.Y.S.2d 29 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Morgan v. Robinson, 3 App. Div. 2d 216, 159 N.Y.S.2d
639 (1957); Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1154 (1961).
56. Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa 114, 21 N.W.2d 311 (1946).
57. 1 WiObioR, EvmEcE 251 (3d ed. 1940).
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tial fact, not a piece of evidence which is excludable because it lacks
trustworthiness.58 The "don't think about it" advice is less convincing
in this situation, 59 and Dean Wigmore probably realized it when he
suggested that no final solution to the problem of fair trials is likely
until something is done by the profession about "the constant partisan
zeal, the lurking chicanery, the needless unpreparedness, of counsel." 60
He lamented, a generation ago, that the trial lawyer was throwing
away his professional dignity:
How disgraceful and degraded it commonly is, we seldom pause to
reflect. And its worst feature is that it has dragged down our most
accomplished and highminded practitioners to employ their
talents in this ungentlemanly spectacle. 61
62
B. Innuendo: The Cline Case
In 1953, Melvin Cline, 56, a Chicago salesman, was injured when
struck by a Kirchwehm Brothers' truck while he was crossing a Chicago
street. Cline was hit as he stepped from behind an illegally parked
truck owned by M. A. Soper Company. Cline sued both Kirchwehm
and Soper in a superior court in Chicago; the first trial ended in mistrial; in the second Cline recovered $30,000 in damages.
Cline's ordeal of medical treatment began with relatively routine
orthopedic surgery in 1953 and has not yet ended. His injuries were
at first a fractured arm and shoulder; he now has an immobile, useless
and painful arm and shoulder. His treatment included the efforts of
four doctors, examination by several others and seven hospitalizations

58. See Cross v. State, 68 Ala. 476 (1881).
59. Although Nappi v. Falcon Truck Renting Corp., 286 App. Div. 123, 141 N.Y.S.2d
424 (1955), aff'd mem., 1 N.Y.2d 750, 152 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1956), appears to support the Wigmore thesis even in this situation. However, note Judge Bostow's strong dissenting opinion
and the authorities he cites.
60. 1 WiGMopR, EVIDENC E 262 (3d ed. 1940).
61. Id. at 266. See Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y
166, 167-68 (1929), and Part I-D, infra.
62. An abstract of this opinion is published, Cline v. Kirchwehm Bros. Cartage Co., 42
Ill. App. 2d 85, 191 N.E.2d 410 (1963), but most of the data on which this discussion is
based has not been published. It was supplied to the author by Mr. James A. Dooley, of
the Chicago Bar, who was Melvin Cline's counsel. It includes: a letter to the author from
Mr. Dooley, dated January 7, 1964 [hereinafter cited as "Dooley Letter']; the Brief and
Argument for Plaintiff-Appellant [hereinafter cited as "Cline Brief']; a transcript of record
in support of Cline's position [hereinafter cited as "Cline Transcript']; the Brief and
Argument of M. A. Soper Co., defendant-appellee and cross-appellant [hereinafter cited
as "Soper Brief"]; the Brief and Argument for Kirchwehm Bros. Cartage Co., defendantappellee; an abstract of record in support of the position of M. A. Soper Co.; the Brief and
Argument for Cline in opposition to the Soper cross-appeal; and the Reply Brief for Cline.
Copies of the unpublished opinion, General Docket No. 48714, First District, Third
Division, Appellate Court of Illinois [hereinafter cited as "Court's Opinion'] were furnished to the author by Mr. Dooley and by Callahan & Co., the publisher of the official
Illinois appellate opinions.
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-five of them for surgery and one, of six weeks duration, for hepatitis
caused by a bone-grafting operation.
Taking what his lawyer called the "long draw, ' 63 Cline filed for a
new trial, lost that motion and then appealed from the $30,000 verdict
to the Appellate Court of Illinois. He contended that the jury's award
was inadequate and asked for a new trial limited to the issue of
damages. (His evidence indicated special damages totalling $114,000
and testimony indicated a permanent loss of income as well as past and
future pain and suffering. 64) Cline's brief, in pertinent part, contended
that the jury had been influenced by the improper conduct of both
defendants' attorneys. "The pattern of defense," his brief said, "sought
to confuse the jury with a welter of collateral, irrelevant and improper
matters" 6 5-pointing to precedent which reversed at the behest of a
plaintiff for a "pattern of misconduct which runs through the case."' 6
Specifically, Cline's brief relied on four kinds of misconduct, all of
them substantially constituting innuendo or suggestions to the jury:
(1) that much of Cline's difficulty dated from injury pre-existing the
accident at issue; (2) that Cline had received incompetent medical care;
(3) that a fall Cline had when on the way to visit one of his numerous
physicians was the real cause of non-union of his fracture; and (4) that
Cline's trial testimony was at variance with what he said during a
pretrial deposition. 67 Questions in all of these areas had been ruled
improper by the trial judge.68 As Cline's brief said, persistent efforts to
introduce testimony which is probably inadmissible or upon which
the trial judge has already ruled puts the opponent at a double-edged
disadvantage:
First, it permits a party to get before the jury the facts it has no
right to prove; second, it puts the objecting party in the position
of having to make repetitious objections, thus implanting in the
minds of the jurors that there is something unfavorable in such
evidence. 69
63. Dooley Letter.
64. Cline v. Kirchwehm Bros. Cartage Co., 42 Ill. App. 2d 85, 191 N.E.2d 410 (1963).
65. Cline Brief p. 21.
66. Ibid.; see notes 91 and 92 infra.
67. Cline Transcript.
68. Ibid. In most of the instances which were relied upon by the appellate court in
reversing, the trial judge had sustained objections or stricken testimony; however, in
these instances, he was not asked to instruct the jury to disregard. When he was asked to
do that, he did it. Mr. Dooley, and most trial lawyers, take a dim view of the efficacy of
therapeutic instructions. Dooley letter:
You make reference to the question of whether the errors were cured by instructions.
A real error is never cured by the court's instructions. As the old lady on the jury
said, "The court may say 'strike it,' but I am listening to everything I hear and
remembering it too."
69. Cline Brief p. 25.
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To illustrate his point, Cline pointed to several series of questions
which suggested illegitimate defenses to the jurors, and which forced
Cline's lawyer to assume repeatedly the role of an obstacle to the
presentation of the facts:
1. After the trial judge ruled improper certain questions concerning an X-ray not presented for admission into evidence, Kirchwehm's counsel attempted three times to elicit information on the
X-ray and forced Cline's attorney to object.7 0 In addition Soper'scounsel went into the same subject after Kirchwehm's attorney,
again forcing objections. 71
2. On three occasions, the defendants' lawyers attempted to
explore an eye injury Cline had suffered before the accident at
issue, and in each case the trial judge sustained objections to the
questions.72
3. Defense attorneys also attempted two series of questions on
treatment for a hernia Cline had had two years before the accident
at issue. In one of these exchanges, defense counsel appears to have
defied the court's ruling on the subject. 73 Similar questions, centered on a heart attack Cline had before the litigated accident, and
attempts to admit inadmissible hospital records again cast his
lawyer in the role of suppressor of evidence. 74
4. Finally, repeated improper impeaching questions suggested
to the jury that Cline himself had changed his story between the
time of a pretrial deposition and the trial. Most of these questions
were objected to and objections to them were almost invariably
sustained. 75
Although Cline's brief did not detail the instances of precautionary
instructions, the abstract of record he filed with his brief indicated that
the trial judge, in a relatively perfunctory manner, had instructed
the jury to disregard improper questions and comments 7 6
Both defense briefs on appeal relied on improper conduct by Cline's
lawyer and on the contention that defense tactics were justified in the
circumstances. Both defendants also contended that the jury verdict
was justified by the evidence and, if it was not, that the inadequacy
was the result of a compromise on liability. If a compromise on liability is indicated in the record, Illinois precedent requires a new
trial on all issues and will not permit a new trial confined only to the
70. Cline Brief; Cline Transcript.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Cline Transcript p. 78.
74. Cline Brief p. 28: "With no holds barred, and without much more than pretense at
refreshing recollection, the contents of inadmissible hospital records were detailed for the
jury in a manner that cast the plaintiff in the role of suppressor of evidence."
75. Cline Brief; Cline Transcript; Dooley Letter.
76. See note 68 supra.
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damages issue. 77 Soper also appealed for a reversal of the trial court's
judgment, contending that it was not negligent in parking its truck
78
where it did.
The appellate court reversed and ordered a new trial on the
damages issue. In an unpublished opinion written by Justice McCormick, the court sustained Cline's position that improper defense
tactics had prejudiced the jury against him. 79 The court initially noted
that an injured plaintiff does not insure the competence of the physicians he hires to treat him. If he "exercises ordinary care in employing
a medical practitioner and the practitioner by reason of malpractice
aggravates the original injury, the original tort-feasor is liable for the
aggravation."' 0 In the absence of evidence of Cline's negligence in
choosing his physicians, any testimony directed at their competence
would have been improper. In any case, "the defendants did not introduce evidence to challenge the competency of these men, nor did the
evidence in the record show that the procedures followed by them
were not in accordance with proper medical procedure." 8' The court
then carefully detailed the questions which, according to Cline, injected
the illegitimate issue of medical competence into the trial.8 2 The court
77. See Part JI-C, infra.
78. Soper Brief.
79. The court also ruled in Cline's favor as a matter of law as to Soper's contention that
it had not been negligent.
80. Court's Opinion p. 18.
81. Id. at 19.
82. Because the opinion was not published, the quotation of substantial parts of it in
these notes seems justified. Id. at 19-21:
In the cross-examination of the physicians attending the plaintiff counsel for both
defendants attacked the experience of the attending doctors with reference to their
treatment of the fractured humerus. They questioned whether the doctors had experience in the use of intramedullary pins and suggested that the use of these pins
was improper. They attempted to show that the doctor had failed to remove the scar
tissue, and they suggested that the scar tissue should have been subjected to a
pathological study, that the cast had been removed too soon, and that the doctor
was remiss in not protecting the blood transfusion procedures through which the
plaintiff acquired hepatitis. An attempt was made to show that the several operations
were unnecessary because of improper operative procedure. Again it was suggested
that the nonunion was caused by the premature removal of the fixation process. All
of these questions were objected to and the objections were sustained by the court.
During the cross-examination both counsel for Kirchwehm and counsel for Soper
persisted in attacking the competency of the attending doctors and in many instances
disregarded the court's ruling on objections. In one instance counsel for Kirchwehm,
after the court had ruled that he might call the doctor's attention to the hospital
records without asking him to state the contents thereof, asked the doctor as to
whether, having looked at his records, his memory was refreshed as to whether or not
a fracture line was evident in that x-ray. The court said: "No, you are doing just the
thing I told you not to do. Strike it out, and the jury will disregard it." In crossexamination of a doctor by counsel for Soper the doctor was asked the following
question: "Doctor, if there were sufficient force to cause such a piece of bone to detach itself by a fracture, that could be instrumental in causing a nonunion could it
not?" Objection was made and sustained by the court. Counsel again asked in substance the same question, which was again objected to, and the objection was sustained. Counsel then asked the following question: "I believe counsel asked you
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also noted that the foundation, or attempted foundation, for questions
going to aggravation of Cline's injury by his subsequent, fall was not
strong enough to justify inserting that issue into the case.8 3
The questions on pre-existing conditions were also detailed by the
court; 84 all of these, Justice McCormick wrote, were improper under

settled precedent in Illinois, because the plaintiff was not suing for
aggravation of previous injury.8 5 After laying this basis from the record.,
his opinion moved into a candid judgment as to the conduct of the
defense:
The case was being tried for the defendants by two experienced
and competent lawyers. They either knew or should have known
what the law was. Objections were repeatedly sustained by the
court, and defendants' counsel disregarded the rulings. It is a well
known fact that the continual presentation before the jury of questions of this character can be extremely harmful to the plaintiff's
case.
The court found similar misconduct as to impeachment questions
directed at Cline, and it found Cline's lawyer had not conducted him86
self to the prejudice of the defendants' case.
The trial judge's rulings on evidence, which were generally affirmed
by the appellate court, were not sufficient to cure the prejudice which
Cline suffered during trial. The court did not take note of the repeated instances in which the trial judge had not only sustained objections, but had cautioned the jury, sometimes at the request of Cline's
lawyer, to disregard the prejudice.8 7 The issue, Justice McCormick
wrote, is whether the defendants' conduct deprived the plaintiff of a
fair trial. The court held that it did. "When the defendants brought
before the jury, by means of improper questions, matters which were
about subsequent injury to a person who has had a fracture of the humerus. Doctor,
a fall onto the left arm such as you saw on your x-rays, that could be such a subsequent injury as to materially affect the healing of that fracture?" The question was
objected to and the court said: "Counsel, you are back on the same road you were on
before." Counsel replied: "That's right, your Honor." The court: "Sustained."
83. Id. at 21:
It has been held that wliere there was an injury which was aggravated by a subsequent accident the subsequent accident might be considered as flowing from the
original injury. 15 Am. Jur. Damages, sec. 87. Also see annotation, 9 A.L.R. 255.
However, in this case the questions were improper without considering the rule
above mentioned since there was definite evidence in the record that before the plaintiff had left for Iowa City there was a nonunion of the humerus, loss of calcium and
dissolution at the bone ends of the fracture.
84. Court's Opinion p. 21-22.
85. Court's Opinion p. 24:
The questions asked in this examination concerning his previous disease were not
asked for that purpose, nor was there any attempt on the part of the plaintiff to recover on this theory. Hence the questions were totally immaterial.
86. Id. at 24-26.
87. Cline Transcript.
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immaterial and prejudicial, and persisted in such conduct so as to
create a definite pattern in the case, they were depriving the plaintiff
of a fair trial on the question of damages."8 8 The $30,000 verdict was
not the result of jury compromise, but the result rather of "a deliberate
attempt on the part of counsel for the defendants to improperly bring
matters before the jury which would cause them to return a verdict in
an amount less than adequate compensation." 8 9
In 1963, ten years after the accident, Cline, for the third time, presented his damages case to a jury in Chicago. The verdict was $121,400.0
There is ample recent precedent in Illinois for recognizing both the
insidious prejudice of forcing an opponent to obstruct the introduction
of irrelevant testimony 91 and the harmful effect of improper impeaching questions. 92 The same sort of recognition of the corrosive force
of innuendo has been made in other jurisdictions.98 In an Oklahoma
case of last year, for instance, the examining lawyer asked a police officer whether one of the parties had done anything wrong at the accident
scene. The court upon objection, excluded the answer, and the examiner then added: "The witness is impartial, as I understand it, and I
think the jury is entitled to the benefits of his fairness." The Okla88. Court's Opinion p. 27. Mr. Dooley's comments are also worth noting. Dooley Letter:
The verdict was the result of common errors committed frequently without censure.
These are such matters as:
1. Reference to conditions of health which are in nowise associated with the claim
being asserted.
2. Creation of innuendoes in the nature of other accidents, etc., which are never
proved. An innuendo is always more dificult to meet than a fact, for proof of a
fact usually affords cross-examination.
3. Improprieties in impeachment. Daily, witnesses and parties are cross-examined,
not on any matter relevant to the direct examination nor on matters relevant
to the issues. The purpose? To contradict them. Thus, a witness might be asked:
Q. Did you have a blue suit on when crossing the street?
A. I don't recall.
The cross-examiner then refers to the deposition in which the witness said his
suit was blue. This, of course, is a crass illustration, but nonetheless demonstrative of the proposition.
4. Continuous violation of a ruling of the court by counsel.
89. Court's Opinion p. 30.
90. Dooley Letter; NACCA News Letter, Mar. 1964, p. 43.
91. Martin v. Miles, 41 Ill.App. 2d 208, 190 N.E.2d 473 (1963); Roberts v. Hyland
Builders Corp., 34 Ill. App. 2d 276, 181 N.E.2d 197 (1962).
92. Garbel v. Fields, 36 Ill. App. 2d 399, 184 N.E.2d 750 (1962); Moore v. Daydif, 7 Ill.
App. 2d 534, 130 N.E.2d 119 (1955); see People v. Paradise, 30 Ill. 2d 381, 196 N.E.2d 689
(1964); Roberts v. Hyland Builders Corp., supra note 91; Jacobson v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 32 Ill. App. 2d 37, 176 N.E.2d 551 (1961).
93. Wills v. J. J. Newberry Co., 43 Cal. App. 2d 595, 111 P.2d 346 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941),
discussed the connecting-up issue; Phillips v. Vrooman, 361 Mo. 1098, 251 S.W.2d 626
(1952), involved suggestion of insurance by innuendo, and the court reversed despite a
therapeutic instruction. But see Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963),
which left the question open because "no authority is called to our attention." See also
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
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homa Supreme Court thought this one of several reasons justifying
reversal. The court noted:
We have recognized that a party forced to object to an improper
question, may by his objection create an inference that the answer
to the proffered question would establish a fact adverse to his
interest.9 4
II.

APPELLATE ESCAPE VALVES

Appellate judges are stubbornly unwilling to send jury cases back
for new trial if they can avoid it. This is probably dictated in part by
the demands of administration and in part by an honest, if tacit, admission that they are in a poor position to measure prejudice. The
expressed reasons for affirming tainted judgments are, however, something less than candid. The devices and excuses which appellate
judges use-their "escape valves"-have tended to crystallize, at least for
purposes of analysis, into four categories: (1) A new trial is not required
because the party complaining of prejudice invited it; (2) A new trial
is not required because the party complaining of prejudice failed to
object to it during trial; (3) A new trial is not required because the
trial judge cured the prejudice with an instruction to the jury to disregard it; and (4) A new trial is not required because the jury was
not prejudiced. 9 5

A. Invited Prejudice
At its most extreme, the rule of invited prejudice says that an appellant cannot complain of a prejudiced jury if he attempted to prejudice the jury himself, regardless of whether his attempt was successful
and regardless of whether his attempt was temporally or factually
related to that about which he is complaining. In an early Illinois case,
for instance, in which an appellant complained of prejudicial jury
argument, the court denied reversal because the appellant's lawyer had
intimated that the appellee was a convict. 96 The Michigan court once
94. Nash v. Hiller, 380 P.2d 77, 79 (Okla. 1963). See also Houston v. Pettigrew, 353 P.2d
489 (Okla. 1960). The California Appellate Court recognized, in 1941, that the impression
that a party is suppressing evidence may be fatally prejudicial to him, and condemned,
in dicta, attempts to insinuate to the jurors that one of the parties was poor and therefore
in need of a damages judgment; Wills v. J. J. Newberry Co., supra note 93.
95. To these might be added the good-faith and claim of right doctrines, discussed in
Part III-D, infra.
96. Ellsworth v. Cumming, 134 II. App. 397 (1907); see also Mercer v. Millers Mut. Fire
Ins. Ass'n, 249 S.W.2d 402 (Mo. 1952), where the prejudicial conduct came from the
trial judge, but the appellate court refused to reverse because it thought both sides got
"an even break"--which ignores the fact that one side might have lost because of prejudice
and the other have won in spite of it; Wiseman v. Skagit County Dairymen's Ass'n, 172
Wash. 95, 19 P.2d 662 (1933), is a similar case; see also Yerrick v. East Ohio Gas Co., 198
N.E.2d 472 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964); see Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 826, 851 (1964).
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excused a lawyer's prejudicial remark during examination, and refused to grant a new trial, because the witness being examined had pro97
voked the remark.
The seed of logic in the invited prejudice principle is that, if both
parties are responsible for the prejudiced jury, the losing party cannot obtain a new trial for something that was substantially his doing.
The Wisconsin court, for example, assessed a record before it as containing a mutually and "unduly belligerent attitude on the part of
counsel" and "caustic repartee" but, because both parties were responsible for prejudice, if there was prejudice, "neither party is in a
position to avoid the results of the trial."98 The logic of joint responsibility is more apparent when the prejudice involved comes from a
single incident for which the complaining party is substantially responsible. 99 When liability insurance is mentioned by a plaintiff's
lawyer, for instance, the defendant's vociferous objections and suggestive asides (that there is no insurance) may be held to bar him from
complaining of the prejudice. 1°° Jaffray v. Hill'01 is another kind of
recent example. The issue there was a civil suit for damages for assault
and battery, which requires, under Illinois law, a special finding of
malice in the defendant. The defendant's lawyer argued to the jury
that their finding the defendant malicious could send him to jail; the
plaintiff's lawyer, in reply, told the jury he was not asking for a finding
of malice. On appeal, from judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant
argued that the plaintiff's statement was a waiver of an element essential to liability. The court held the argument to be an "appropriate
answer."
The response to the invitation, of course, can be too potent; a youought-not-bilk-this-poor-man statement from a personal injury defense
lawyer may not in every case justify the we're-only-after-his-insurancecompany reply.10 2 Judge Bliss called this sort of thing "flame-throwing,"' 0 3 and the Kansas court said "it is not always safe to follow an
opponent . . . into forbidden territory.' 0 4 The thrust of these prece97. Muncie Wheel & Jobbing Co. v. Finch, 150 Mich. 310, 113 N.W. 1107 (1907).
98. Sandeen v. Willow River Power Co., 214 Wis. 166, 181, 252 N.W. 706, 712 (1934).
99. City Transp. Co. v. Sisson, 365 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Newspapers, Inc.
v. Love, 367 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), and cases cited in the opinion; Texas Sand
Co. v. Shield, 367 S.W.2d 88 (rex. Civ. App. 1963).
100. Big Ledge Copper Co. v. Dedrick, 21 Ariz. 129, 185 Pac. 825 (1919); Santee v. Haggart Constr. Co., 202 Minn. 361, 278 N.W. 520 (1938).
101. 41 Ill. App. 2d 470, 191 N.E.2d 399 (1963).
102. Colquett v. Williams, 264 Ala. 214, 86 So. 2d 381 (1956); Davis v. F. M. Stamper Co.,
347 Mo. 761, 148 S.W.2d 765 (1941). But see Waid v. Bergschneider, 94 Ariz. 21, 381 P.2d
568 (1963) and early Missouri cases distinguished in the Davis opinion.
103. Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa 114, 131, 21 N.W.2d 311, 319 (1946).
104. Pool v. Day, 141 Kan. 195, 203, 40 P.2d 396, 401 (1935).
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dents, however, is not a rejection of the general principle of invited
prejudice. Both Judge Bliss and the Kansas court endorsed the principle but recognized that it has its limits. The escape valve is left intact.
If the complaining party was the original source of the prejudicial
fact, he probably cannot succeed in obtaining a new trial because of
the prejudice flowing from that fact. Insurance, again, is the commonest example. If the defendant indicates the veiled litigant, typically
through examining one of the parties on a statement given to an insurance adjuster, the plaintiff may be entitled to explore the issue without
risking a new trial on the reasoning that the jury already has been
prejudiced. 105 The same principle ought to apply to any sort of irrelevant and prejudicial information. 1 6 But the appellee's capitalization on
facts first introduced by the appellant has to have borne some proportion to the magnitude of the appellant's slip. An inadvertent mention
of insurance by a defendant's witness, for example, does not justify
a full-scale exploration of insurance by the plaintiff.1 7
Cases where the prejudice originates in probative evidence are
logically distinct, although appellate opinions sometimes talk as if
the unfortunate side of a provable fact is a species of invited prejudice.
In Fields v. Creek, 08s the personal injury plaintiff gave an accident
report to the insurer. The defense lawyer attempted to impeach the
plaintiff with this report. On re-direct the plaintiff's lawyer established
that the report was not a report to a friendly third-party because both
sides had the same insurer. Although the court affirmed a judgment
for the plaintiff and talked about invited prejudice, this was a case
involving the prejudicial side of a fact properly before the jury. In
0 9 a property damage case, the salvage value of the
Neil v. McGinn,"
articles damaged was a necessary part of the defendant's case. In proving it his lawyer established that the plaintiff was insured against her
loss. The Supreme Court of Nebraska, overruling a trial judge's order
for a new trial, found unavoidable prejudice.
The invited prejudice principle rarely rises above the status of escape
105. Wills v. J. J. Newberry Co., 4 Cal. App. 2d 595, 111 P.2d 346 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941);
Marshall v. Meade, 23 Misc. 2d 162, 201 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1960); see Brown v. McCuan,
56 Cal. App. 2d 35, 132 P.2d 838 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942), where the jury learned about insurance coverage from the introduction into evidence of medical bills addressed to an insurance company.
106. People v. McElroy, 196 N.E.2d 651 (Ill. 1964), involved a criminal defendant who
contended on direct examination that he did not sell or use narcotics; the court held that
cross-examining him on drug addiction was proper, even though, absent his statements
on direct, addiction was not at issue.
107. Seminole Shell Co. v. Clearwater Flying Co., 156 So. 2d 543 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
108. 21 Wis. 2d 562, 124 N.W.2d 599 (1963).
109. 175 Neb. 369, 122 N.W.2d 65 (1963).
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valve. Appellate judges do not discuss it as a right of the prejudiced
party to reply in kind, except to explain that the reply in kind did not
create reversible prejudice in the jury. Cook v. Latimer is the only
discovered recent case which elevates this escape valve to the dignity
of a right in the party harmed by the prejudice. The plaintiff's lawyer
there stated in his opening statement that the plaintiff was a widow;
her marital status was irrelevant. The defense lawyer objected at the
time, and later offered to prove that the plaintiff had received a substantial sum of money on the occasion of her being widowed, which
was also irrelevant. The trial judge refused to allow proof of the unrelated award to the widow; the Alabama Supreme Court reversed,
finding a right in the defendant to prove an irrelevant fact in response
to the plaintiff's irrelevant statement to the jury: "Where the first illegal evidence is highly prejudicial, the opponent should be allowed to
reply as a matter of right to erase from the minds of the jurors the
first illegal evidence." 110 No doubt trial judges often permit what this
trial judge refused to permit, and appellate courts find such refusals
within the trial court's discretion, but aside from this one recent case,
there appears to be virtually no respect given the invited prejudice rule
except as an appellate escape valve.
Several courts have rejected or refused to use the invited prejudice
excuse for affirming a prejudiced verdict. Some of the cases reject the
principle, but recognize that the prejudice on the juror's mind may
have been affected for the better by the fact that harmful information
came from both sides. Eizerman v. Behn"' is illustrative; the appealing lawyer, the Illinois court thought, had engaged in repeatedly prejudicial tactics all during trial. The defending lawyer's occasionally improper rejoinders were not enough to justify reversal, not because of
invited prejudice, but because prejudice from the other direction was
obviously more flagrant.
Illinois had already rejected invited prejudice as a principle. In
Crutchfield v. Meyer, the court decided it was more realistic to look
at the fact of prejudice aside from whether it had been invited or
not; the goal, the court said, is a fair trial:
The offsetting of one impropriety by another may be an efficient
method of arbitration, but in the conduct of a trial this court is
110. Cook v. Latimer, 274 Ala. 283, 287, 147 So. 2d 831, 834 (1962). But see Williams v.
City of Anniston, 257 Ala. 191, 58 So. 2d 115 (1952), where the same court refused to recog-

nize a right to meet prejudice with prejudice.
111. 9 fI1. App. 2d 263, 132 N.E.2d 788 (1956); see also Seminole Shell Co. v. Clearwater
Flying Co., 156 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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concerned with the question of whether or not the defeated party
received a fair trial. 1 2
The Kansas court, somewhat less emphatically, indicated its dissatisfaction with the principle in 1935."1 And Judge Bliss' opinion, in
Connelly v. Nolte,"4 while implicitly accepting the principle in cases
where invitation and reply arise out of the same incident, expressed
some skepticism of "flame-throwing" in other circumstances. There
are some isolated examples of appellate opinions where the invited
prejudice escape valve was not used. In Paul v. Drown,"5 the plaintiff's
lawyer asked the defendant if he had been arrested for reckless driving;
the defense lawyer, in the jury's presence, offered to prove that he had
not been; the court held this reversibly prejudicial to the plaintiff who
started the colloquy. In Messinger v. Karg, the defendant's lawyer, in a
guest case, said: "I do part company with them when they come into
court and when they ask to be compensated by their friends."" 6 The
plaintiff's lawyer then indicated to the jury that the plaintiff was insured. The court reversed a plaintiff's judgment because of the mention
of insurance.
B. Failure to Object
Best oiled of all the appellate escape valves is the complaining lawyer's failure to make a record in the trial court. This is premised on
the reasonable principle that the trial judge must be given an opportunity to correct error (or prejudice) before the appellate court will
reverse him for failing to correct it. Its fictional side is an assumption
that objection would have accomplished a mitigation of the prejudice,1'7
and amounts to a failure to realize, or at least to say, that when "error
in a trial.., like a dash of ink in a can of milk... cannot be strained
out, the only remedy, so that justice may not ingest a tainted fare, is
a new trial.""18 It may be, as another judge put it, that "the virus has
already entered the jurors' minds and cannot be eliminated by a subsequent ruling.""19 When that is the case, the principle that the complaining party should have objected is unrealistic; it is based on the
fiction that his objection would have accomplished a cure of the preju20
dice.1
112.
113.
114.
110.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

414 Ill. 210, 214, 111 N.E.2d 142, 144 (1953).
Pool v. Day, 147 Kan. 195, 40 P.2d 396 (1935).
237 Iowa 114, 21 N.W.2d 311 (1946); see also the Alabama authorities, supra note
108 Vt. 458, 189 At. 144 (1937).
48 Ohio App. 244, 246, 192 N.E. 864 (1934).
See the empirical data developed in Kalven and Broeder, op. cit. supra note 6.
Lobalzo v. Varoli, 409 Pa. 15, 21, 185 A.d 557, 561 (1962) (Musmanno, J.).
King v. Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R., 138 Iowa 625, 628, 116 N.W. 719, 720 (1908).
See dicta in Utley v. Hecldnger, 235 Ark. 780, 362 S.W.2d 13 (1962).
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There are two theories actuating appellate judges when they hold
that prejudice has vitiated a verdict so badly that the complaining
party's failure to object to it in the trial court does not bar reversal.
One is that the trial judge should have intervened on his own motion. 121 It is "the duty of the trial court," this theory goes, "to carefully exclude all highly prejudicial matter from the jury, and admonish
the jury to wholly disregard the same in the hope thereby of avoiding
a mistrial."' 122 In that case, a fact was involved-the defendant's liability
insurance. In a more recent Illinois Appellate holding, the prejudice
came from a passion-arousing argument. The court, in reversing for
new trial despite the absence of objection, indicated that only aggravated misconduct justifies ignoring the no-objection escape valve:
If prejudicial arguments are made without objection of counsel or
interference of the trial court to the extent that the parties litigant
cannot receive a fair trial and the judicial process stand without
deterioration, then upon review this court may consider such
assignments of error, even though no objection was made and no
ruling made or preserved thereon. 12
Aggravated misconduct apparently includes wilfully unethical be24
havior.
The other appellate theory justifying reversal even in the absence
of a record preserving objection to prejudice turns on a weighing of
the evidence. If the issues were so close that the prejudice probably
accounts for the verdict, reversal is indicated whether or not there
was objection and whether or not the trial judge had a duty to intervene on his own motion in the absence of objection. The meagure is
applicable in deciding to reverse 1 25 as well as in deciding that the
verdict was not vitiated by prejudice. 126 But these are rare cases. The
usual attitude is to affirm judgment when no objection was made
121. People v. Bernette, 197 N.E.2d 486 (Ill. 1964); see Shaffer, Bullets, Bad Florins, and
Old Boots: A Report of the Indiana Trial Judges Seminar on the Judge's Control Over
Demonstrative Evidence, 39 NoTRE DAME LAW. 20, 33 (1963).
122. Pool v. Day, 141 Kan. 195, 200, 40 P.2d 396, 399 (1935).
123. Belfield v. Coop, 8 Ill. 2d 293, 313, 134 N.E.2d 249, 259 (1956).
124. See Swanson v. Evans Oil, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 875, 209 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1961), where
the court relied on the fact that the appellee's lawyer "must be assumed to know" that
what he did was improper; Gordon v. Checker Taxi Co., 334 Ill. App. 313, 79 N.E.2d 632
(1948). Contra, Causey v. Cornelius, 164 Cal. App. 2d 269, 330 P.2d 468 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958); cf. Part III-D, infra.
125. Klotz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 877
(1959); see also Cook v. Latimer, 274 Ala. 283, 147 So. 2d 831 (1962); Colquett v. Williams,
264 Ala. 214, 86 So. 2d 381 (1956).
126. Boop v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 118 Ohio App. 171, 193 N.E.2d 714 (1963); Fields v.
Creek, 21 Wis. 2d 562, 124 N.W.2d 599 (1963).
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below and this is so whether the prejudice arose from argument 27 or
from the assertion of an irrelevant fact. 28 Failure to object is usually
29
fatal.1
Not only must the objection be made, it must be made at the time
the prejudice occurs, 130 even if this requires inviting the wrath of the
trial judge by objecting to something he does.' 31 The Georgia court
recently held that the objection has to be renewed after the court's
instructions, to record the fact that the complaining party thinks the
instructions did not cure the prejudice. 32 And the objection must be
specific enough to inform the trial judge of the prejudice. If it is too
broad, the escape valve is still intact; 8 if it is too vague, it also
fails, 8 4 unless the prejudice was so serious that the court's action
would not have cured it. 35 The objector may have to go beyond objection, particularly where the prejudice of which he complains occurred
in a voir dire examination or jury speech which is not transcribed by
the reporter (in which case he has to get a transcription or at least get
the agreement of counsel and the trial judge as to what-happened). 8 6
If, upon objection, the trial judge defers to the objecting lawyer for
a suggestion on curing the prejudice, the lawyer may not preserve his
appeal unless he suggests something.3 7 If the objector has recorded his
objection to a line of testimony and fails to renew it each time the
subject comes up later, he waives his error.8 8 The objector may even
127. United States v. Johnson, 331 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1964); Handler v. Eckhouse, 45 Ill.
App. 2d 382, 195 N.E.2d 838 (1964); Smith v. Musgrove, 372 Mich. 329, 125 N.W.2d 869
(1964); see also editorial comment at 13 DEFENSE L.J. 291 (1964).
128. United States v. Spatuzza, 331 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1964); Boettger v. Babcock 9: Wilcox
Co., 253 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1958); Buchanan v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 159 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.
1947); Grzybowski v. Arrow Barge Co., 177 F. Supp. 568 (D. Md. 1959); Riolfo v. Market
St. Ry., 78 Cal. App. 2d 385, 177 P.2d 753 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Handler v. Eckhouse, 45 IIl.
App. 2d 382, 195 N.E.2d 838 (1964); Stegmann v. Zachariah, 46 Ill. App. 2d 7, 196 N.E.2d
703 (1964); Breslin v. Blair, 249 Ky. 178, 60 S.W.2d 337 (1933); Hayward v. Richardson
Constr. Co., 126 Mont. 240, 347 P.2d 475 (1959).
129. Davenport v. United States, 260 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 909
(1959); Holmes v. United States, 134 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1943); Shanowat v. Checker Taxi
Co., 198 N.E.2d 573 (II1. App. Ct. 1964); Marshall v. State, 5 Tex. Crim. App. 273 (1878);
Carter v. Nelms, 204 Va. 338, 131 S.E.2d 401 (1963); Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1148 (1960).
130. Kickels v. Fein, 104 Ind. App. 606, 10 N.E.2d 297 (1937).
131. Gerner v. Marshall, 193 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. App. Ct. 1963); Kennedy v. Woods, 131
Neb. 217, 267 N.W. 390 (1936).
132. Lyle v. Dipuma, 107 Ga. App. 880, 131 S.E.2d 784 (1963).
133. Southern Pac. R.R. v. San Francisco Co. Sav. Union, 146 Cal. 290, 79 Pac. 961 (1905).
134. Raymore v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 141 S.W.2d 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940).
135. Cook v. Latimer, 274 Ala. 283, 147 So. 2d 831 (1962); Colquett v. Williams, 264 Ala.
214, 86 So. 2d 381 (1956).
136. Big Ledge Copper Co. v. Dedrick, 21 Ariz. 129, 185 Pac. 825 (1919); Henry v. Huff,
143 Pa. 548, 22 At. 1046 (1891); see also Part III-B, infra.
137. Koppang v. Sevier, 106 Mont. 79, 75 P.2d 790 (1938).
138. Parnham v. Carl W. Linder Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 224, 183 N.E.2d 744 (1962).
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have a duty to argue with the judge; in Young v. Missouri Pub. Serv.
Co.,189 for instance, objection was made to jury argument several
times and each time the trial judge said they have the instructions, to
which the objector said nothing. The Supreme Court of Missouri
thought this silence was acquiescence in the trial judge's determination
that the instructions cured the prejudice. If the trial judge promises
instructions and, does not give them, no error is preserved unless the
objector complains of the failure to give the instructions. 140 These
more-than-objection cases are a random sample which indicates, more
than anything else, that when the no-objection escape valve sticks, it
sticks open, not closed. At their worst they force a lawyer to raise so
much protest in the trial court that he annoys the trial judge and risks
4
an invited prejudice contention as to his own conduct.' '
It probably should be enough to record objection to prejudicial
conduct, but some courts apparently also require a timely motion for
mistrial. 42 This requirement appears most rigid where the prejudice
is slight enough that the appellate court thinks a therapeutic instruction would have cured it4 s These cases implicitly admit that a party
injured by prejudice will rarely ask for a therapeutic instruction. It is
interesting to note that the Texas court has recently overruled an early
principle that required both objection and motion for mistrial. 44
C. The Therapeutic Instruction
The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by
instructions to the jury ...all practicing lawyers know to be un45
mitigated fiction.
The editors of Case and Comment produced in 1962 a more telling
comment on the therapeutic instruction, but because it was a cartoon,
it is not easily quoted in the pages of a learned journal. In the cartoon,
139. 374 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1964).
140. Lyle v. Dipuma, 107 Ga. App. 880, 131 S.E.2d 784 (1963); editorial comment, 13
DFFF sE L.J. 291 (1964).
141. Crandall v. St. Mary's Hosp. of Troy, 13 App. Div. 2d 595, 212 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1961).
142. Wills v. J. J. Newberry Co., 43 Cal. App. 2d 595, 111 P.2d 346 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941);
Wade v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 150 Tex. 557, 244 S.W.2d 197 (1951); Texas Gen.
Indem. Co. v. Bridwell, 304 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
143. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Gothard, 273 Ala. 424, 142 So. 2d 712 (1962); Sanitary Mkt.
v. Hall, 223 Ala. 525, 137 So. 435 (1931); Burns v. Atchison T. & S.F.R.R., 372 P.2d 36 (Okla.
1962); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Sturgeon, 142 Tex. 222, 177 S.W.2d 264 (1944).
144. Condra Funeral Home v. Rollin, 158 Tex. 478, 314 S.W.2d 277 (1958), overruling
Ford v. Carpenter, 147 Tex. 447, 216 S.W.2d 558 (1949); see also Pittman v. Baladez, 158
Tex. 372, 312 S.W.2d 210 (1958); Southern Pac. Co. v. Hubbard, 156 Tex. 525, 297 S.W.2d
120 (1957); Houseman v. DeCuir, 155 Tex. 127, 283 S.W.2d 732 (1955); and Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Haywood, 153 Tex. 242, 266 S.W.2d 856 (1954).
145. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J.).

1964]

APPELLATE COURTS AND PREJUDICED VERDICTS

an examining lawyer and his friendly witness wear smug, contented
smiles; the opposing lawyer is on his feet and angry; each member of
the jury sits with his mouth open, his hair on end and his eyes filled
with horror. The judge, his eyes complacently closed, is saying to no
one in particular: "Objection sustained-the jury will disregard the
last remark."' 46 Aside from whether judicial instructions to disregard
aggravate prejudice, they clearly do not cure it-as is known by everyone from a cartoonist to an empirical researcher 47 to an associate
justice of the United States Supreme Court.
It is unlikely that appellate judges have any faith in the therapeutic
instruction; they adhere to the ritual of cure, but they know in their
hearts that cure is unlikely in most cases and virtually impossible with
the usual pallid rhetoric of judicial instruction. It is a bit of magic,
an incantation, as the Texas court recently described it, at which "any
evil genii then at large would scurry away to dissolve into nothingness .
.148'.. But practical necessity, which is the magic lamp that
houses these genii, is more potent than logic or psychology; and it is
necessity which explains the fact that therapy by instruction retains
its vitality in the opinions 49 and even in statutes.150 Particularly in
cases where the appellate judges regard as boilerplate the contention
that the jury was prejudiced, the escape valve is always open.' 51 Most
of the opinions do not inquire into the verbal content of the instruction; they are even less interested in the inflection or forcefulness with
which the jury hears it. Like a labial prayer, the incantation need
only be spoken; no one need demonstrate that it was heard, nor that
146. Case & Com., Jan.-Feb., 1962, p. 56.
147. Kalven and Broeder, op. cit. supra note 6.
148. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Broadnax, 365 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), casting
a rare spark of judicial sarcasn at the controlling Texas precedents on the question, Texas
& N.O.R.R. v. Sturgeon, 142 Tex. 222, 177 S.W.2d 264 (1944), and Wade v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 150 Tex. 557, 244 S.W.2d 197 (1951).
149. Lumerman v. Dikoff, 21 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Florida E. Coast Ry.
v. Schweida, 151 So. 2d 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Kramer v. Northwestern Elevator
Co., 91 Minn. 346, 98 N.W. 96 (1904); Rose v. St. Louis-S.F.R.R., 315 Mo. 1181, 289 S.W.
913 (1926); Klinker v. Third Ave. R.R., 26 App. Div. 822, 49 N.Y. Supp. 793 (1898);
Southland Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Matthews, 74 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). See
also Skeeters v. Skeeters, 389 P.2d 313 (Ore. 1964); Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 826 (1964).
150. GA. CoDE ANN. § 81-1009 (1956), requires that the trial judge, by "all needful and
proper instructions to the jury endeavor to remove the improper impression from their
minds..
" See generally, cases arising where one of two or more federal criminal defendants enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in the presence of the jury, and there
is an issue of prejudice as to remaining co-defendants: Delli Paoli v. United States, 352
U.S. 232 (1957); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Hines v. United States,
131 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1942); United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 811
U.S. 205 (1940); United States v. Rollnick, 91 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1937).
151. Lumerman v. Dikoff, 21 Cal. Rptr. 402 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Ford Motor Co. v.
Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963).
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it was understood, nor that it was followed. 152 This is not to say that
the appellate opinions make no attempt to demonstrate that therapy
by instruction is rational. They do. In the first place, whether it works
or not, the therapeutic instruction is apparently harmless, though on
closer examination, it can aggravate prejudice. In the second place,
appellate judges frequently protest their patriotic and humanitarian
belief that jurors, being good citizens, do what they are told. 5 And
finally, there are at least two ancillary rationalizations for the therapeutic instruction.
One of these rationalizations is a hybrid between the therapy escape
valve and the no-objection escape valve (with apologies for mixing the
metaphor of manufacture with the metaphor of genetics); it is a sort
of "friends again" theory, imposed when the record shows that, after
the court's cure was applied to the prejudice, the objector appeared
to have been mollified. In Guttman v. Civet,154 the trial judge became
so incensed at one of the lawyers that, according to the appellant's

brief, he "erred in throwing a file at the plaintiff's counsel in full view
of the jury." When his ammunition ran out, the judge apologized
("I didn't mean to throw it at you."). The erstwhile target said "it's a
slip, that's all, judge." Any prejudice arising from the trial judge's
pointed demonstration, the appellate court said, was cured by all of this
graciousness. The same sort of reasoning is not uncommon in lesser
instances of judicial pique. 155 Apology and friendliness are of the

essence.1 56 Many of the cases adopting the friends again principle place
weight on the fact that the offender withdrew his harmful thrust, as in
Blount Bros. Constr. Co. v. Rose,157 where the plaintiff's lawyer told
152. See, however, Greear v. Noland Co., 197 Va. 233, 89 S.E.2d 49 (1955), which turns
on the inadequacy of the trial judge's therapeutic instruction.
153. Walker v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 155 Tex. 617,-291 S.W.2d 298 (1956); Price
v. King, 122 N.W.2d 318 (Iowa 1963); see Kalven and Broed 'r, op. cit. supra note 6, for
empirical data. Amandes, From Voir Dire to Verdict Through a Juror'sEyes, 9 PRAc. LAW.
21 (No. 6, 1963), is empirical evidence for the validity of the assumption, but only if one
is willing to generalize Professor Amandes' interesting personal experiences.
154. 161 Cal. App. 2d 816, 821, 822, 327 P.2d 232, 235 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); see Annot.,
94 A.L.R.2d 826, 861 (1964).
155. Balance v. Dunnington, 241 Mich. 383, 217 N.W. 329 (1928); McCue v. Detroit
United Ry., 210 Mich. 554, 178 N.W. 68 (1920); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Simon, 126 S.W.2d
674 (rex. Civ. App. 1939); Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 826, 861-64 (1964).
156. Stephenson v. City of Raleigh, 178 N.C. 168, 100 S.E. 312 (1919). Contra, Kane v.
American Tankers Corp., 219 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1955); Darrow v. Pierce, 91 Mich. 63, 51
N.W. 813 (1892).
157. 274 Ala. 429, 149 So. 2d 821 (1962); see also Daniel Constr. Co. v. Pierce, 270 Ala.
522, 120 So. 2d 381 (1959); Vachon v. Ives, 150 Conn. 452, 190 A.2d 601 (1963); cf. Gulf,
Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Hampton, 358 S.W.2d 690 (rex. Civ. App. 1962); and King Constr. Co.
v. Flores, 359 S.W.2d 919 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), but note that both of these cases also
turn on an absence of objection; see generally 1 JONEs, EVIDENCE § 358 (Gard. ed. 1958).
Contra, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Smith, 107 Ga. App. 384, 130 S.E.2d 355 (1963); Central
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the jury that a $25,000 verdict would not be a "slap on the leg" to the
wealthy defendant, then withdrew the comment.
Another theory, the greatest supporter of which is probably the late
Dean Wigmore, reasons that an instruction is effective, or at least as
effective as an instruction can be, when it explains to the jury the reason
for the law of evidence excluding the prejudicial fact or assertion from
their consideration. 158 This theory is most appealing in the example
Dean Wigmore gave-an unqualified expert witness-and in cases
where the prejudicial assertion is a mistake of law. 5 9 It is less convincing when there is involved a relevant fact which the law excludes
on grounds of policy; there is reason to doubt the faith in the goddess
of reason demonstrated by the Iowa court last year, when it said:
Rather than pretence by silence that there is no such thing as
insurance it would be far better practice to routinely tell a jury
by proper instruction that whether or not any party has any kind
of insurance has nothing whatsoever to do with the issues to be
decided by the jury. Such is the law and in the administration of
justice the truth is more effective than mystery. 160
Although some courts encourage trial judges to admonish erring
lawyers in the jury's presence, under the theory that this will be more
impressive to them than a routine direction to disregard, 16 others
apparently think mystery still has its place in jury trials. 0 2 And,
mystery aside, there is an occasional appellate opinion which admits
that not even full explanation can cure prejudice, 16 3 especially where
the prejudice is obviously of the caliber which jurors heed despite
64
admonition.1
Container Corp. v. Westbrook, 105 Ga. App. 855, 126 S.E.2d 264 (1962); Darrow v. Pierce,
91 Mich. 63, 51 N.W. 813 (1892); Burke v. Cremeens, 114 Ohio App. 313, 182 N.E.2d 324
(1961).
158. 1 WIGMoRE, EvJ:DEN E § 8a (3d ed. 1940).
159. Ibid.; see Quarant v. Parkinson, 44 Ill. App. 2d 303, 194 N.E.2d 804 (1963); Wagnon
v. Porchia, 235 Ark. 731, 361 S.W.2d 749 (1962), and the discussion of liability insurance
in Part I-A, supra.But see Ryan v. Monson, 33 Ill. App. 2d 406, 179 N.E.2d 449 (1961).
160. Price v. King, 122 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Iowa 1963). The Iowa court is not without
judicial support. See Throckmorton v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 179 F.2d 165 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 944 (1950); Neill v. McGinn, 175 Neb. 369, 122 N.W.2d 65 (1963).
161. Moran v. Moran, 52 R.I. 291, 160 At. 619 (1932); Sullivan v. Collins, 107 Wis. 291,
83 N.W. 310 (1900).
162. Quarant v. Parkinson, 44 Ill. App. 2d 803, 194 N.E.2d 804 (1963); Quigley v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 78 N.Y. Supp. 1133 (N.Y. City Ct. 1902); Empire Oil & Ref. Co. v. Fields,
188 Okla. 666, 112 P.2d 395 (1940), appealdismissed, 314 U.S. 572 (1941).
163. Peterson v. Eighmie, 175 App. Div. 113, 161 N.Y. Supp. 1065 (1916); Frank v. Subin,
126 N.Y. Supp. 81 (1910); see generally authorities cited, Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 826, 864, n.22
(1964).
164. Kaufnan-Straus Co. v. Short, 311 Ky. 78, 223 S.W.2d 367 (1949); Lilly v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 318 Pa. 248, 177 At. 779 (1935); Halepeska v. Callihan Interests,
Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. 1963).
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Because the escape valve of therapy by instruction is based on a
non-fact, a fiction, it differs from the escape valves of no-objection and
invited prejudice, which are based on rules of policy in the administration of justice (or at least on rules of procedure). Of the three, only
the therapy escape valve is make-believe. It may be the peculiar pretense about it which explains why it has been attacked in the courts
more consistently than any of the other escape valves, and the fact that
there are a certain number of cases where it could have been applied
and was rejected. There are courses of conduct, in other words, which
justify a new trial, and no amount of attempted therapy will work to
correct their harm.165 Only occasionally do judges appear to reject in
their opinions the whole idea of therapy by instruction, 166 or to express
a lack of faith in it without rejecting it; 167 they more often weigh the

record and determine either that the verdict bears the mark of prejudice, despite therapy, or that therapy could not have worked in the
circumstances because the prejudice was the kind that is not cured by
instruction.
The initial question ought to be whether the therapy appears to
have worked, expressing an awareness of the fact that it might not have
worked. 18 The second question should be the development of some
sort of judicial device for measuring the effect of the therapy, aside
from the fairly common assertion that the judges believe the instruction to have been ineffective. 6 9 One school of thought places an appellate burden of proof on the appellee when a seriously prejudicial
incident is in the record. The Illinois court once said that it would
affirm when it found prejudice plus therapy only if it could not avoid
affirming on the evidence. 7 0 A less involved formula was developed
in New York: "When illegal evidence properly excepted to has been
received during a trial, it must be shown that the verdict was not
165. See Bale v. Chicago Junction Ry., 259 Ill.
476, 102 N.E. 808 (1913).
166. See Furst v. Second Ave. R.R., 72 N.Y. 542 (1878), which held that an agreement to
withdraw prejudicial evidence did not remove it from the jurors' consideration.
167. Lacy v. Uganda Inv. Corp., 195 N.E.2d 586 (Ohio Ct. App. 1964).
168. Bishop v. Citizens' Trust & Say. Bank, 321 Ill. 518, 152 N.E. 580 (1926); Miller v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 3 Ill. App. 2d 223, 121 N.E.2d 348 (1954); Lilly v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 318 Pa. 248, 177 AtI. 779 (1935).
169. Ibid.; Ryan v. Monson, 33 II. App. 2d 406, 179 N.E.2d 449 (1961); Eizerman v.
Behn, 9 Il1. App. 2d 263, 132 N.E.2d 788 (1956); Taylor v. Adams, 58 Mich. 187, 24 N.W.
864 (1885); Lengle v. North Lebanon Township, 274 Pa. 51, 117 Ati. 403 (1922); cf. Snyder v.
Lehigh Valley R.R., 245 F.2d 112 (3d Cir. 1957); Vergano v. New York, 128 N.Y.S.2d 705
(Sup. Ct. 1953).
170. Howe Mach. Co. v. Rosine, 87 Ill. 105 (1877); see McKee v. Yellow Cab Co., 36
Ill. App. 2d 415, 184 N.E.2d 743 (1962), and Sims v. Chicago Transit Authority, 7 Ill. App.
2d 21, 129 N.E.2d 23 (1955).
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affected by it or the judgment will be reversed."1 71 This latter formula
appears to be the modem one.172 However it is put, the formula is a
patent indication that the court is minded to reverse because of the
prejudice and despite therapeutic instruction. Proving in an appellate
court that misconduct did not influence the jury is so near the impossible that the "burden of proof" formula usually can be taken to be a
conclusion for reversal.
A second device for determining whether the trial judge's therapy
was effective is the weighing of evidence. A typical guidepost is the
amount of the verdict in an appeal where liability has been decided
for the plaintiff, or the amount of liability evidence where judgment
has gone for the defendant.1 73 The great virtue in weighing the evidence, however onerous that responsibility is to a common law judge,
is that it effectively avoids a duty "to determine, what no human
tribunal can ever satisfactorily determine, that is, what influence and
impression the mind of another might have received ....- 174
A third approach does not consider the effectiveness of the trial
judge's therapy itself but simply makes the determination whether or
not the prejudice was so potent that it must have influenced the jury
(whether it in fact did or not). The question, as put by a federal court
of appeals was: "Could its undeniably harmful effect be obliterated by
the court's admonition to the jury, or was it such that, in the contemplation of the law, the trial could no longer be proceeded with
with fairness and impartiality. . . ?"175 The decision to affirm under
the above approach is made easily where the appeal is from a trial
judge's order granting a new trial 7 6 but it also has come readily
in cases where reversal was necessary. 77 There is in these cases usually
171. Erben v. Lorillard, 19 N.Y. 299, 302 (1859).
172. Swanson v. Evans Oil, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 875, 209 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1961); Lilly v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 318 Pa. 248, 177 Ad. 779 (1935); see also Richards v. Noyes, 44

Wis. 609 (1878).
173. Lafayette, Bloomington & Miss. R.R. v. Winslow, 66 Ill. 219, 223 (1872) ("We are
compelled to believe, from the amount of this verdict, that this testimony had a great
influence on the minds of the jury.... . .'); Lycoming Fire Ins. Co. v. Rubin, 79 IIn. 402,
408 (1875) ("That this proof had great effect upon this jury is evident from the amount
of the verdict. .. .'); see Klotz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 877 (1959); Sheets v. Garringer, 194 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. App. Ct. 1963); Richards v.
Noyes, supra note 172.
174. State Bank v. Dutton, 11 Wis. 389, 392 (1860); see Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U.S. 361

(1895).
175. Beck v. Wings Field, Inc., 122 F.2d 114, 116 (3d Cir. 1941).
176. King v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 138 Iowa 625, 116 N.W. 719 (1908); see Part Ill-B,
infra.
177. Rosa v. City of Chester, 278 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1960); C. M. Spring Drug Co. v.
United States, 12 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1926); McJunkin v. Kiner, 157 Pa. Super. 578, 43 A.2d
608 (1945); G.C. & S.F. Ry. v. Levy, 59 Tex. 542 (1883); see Colquett v. Williams, 264 Ala.
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no distinction as to categories of prejudice, although some of the early
cases adopted the position that prejudice from the mention of certain
forbidden facts was bound to be prejudicial and incurable. 7 8 A few
cases, however, contain an implied distinction between the introduction of an irrelevant and prejudicial fact, and the emotional prejudice
contained in an improper argument. A strong argument to that effect
was made in a 1955 dissenting opinion in the New York Supreme
Court; 179 the Illinois court once implied the same reasoning where the

record showed continued implications by the plaintiff's lawyer that the
defendant was a bank robber, 8 0 and, in another case, recently came to
the same conclusion when faced with prejudicial facts introduced into
a capital murder trial.' 8 ' The distinction was impliedly recognized in
the Supreme Court of the United States as early as 1894, when the
court talked about the peculiarly potent prejudice that comes from
82
"the illegal use of evidence."'
A number of cases which turn on the inadequacy of therapy are to
be distinguished from those in which judges at the appellate level find
no fault in the therapy but believe that any therapy would have been
useless. In a Mississippi opinion of last year, the court reversed because
the judge's telling the jurors that they were all reasonable men was
not potent enough to cure a golden-rule jury argument; 8 3 the Supreme
Court of the United States recently reversed a case because the extension of the therapeutic instruction did not cover all possible prejudice
in improper testimony; 8 4 other recent cases fit into the same category.8 5 Even perfunctory instructions occasionally have come under
fire, contrary to the implications of the Case and Comment cartoon.'86
214, 222, 86 So. 2d 381, 388 (1956) ("neither retraction nor rebuke would have destroyed
the strongly prejudicial suggestions ..
178. See Part I-A, supra.
179. Nappi v. Falcon Truck Renting Corp., 286 App. Div. 123, 141 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1955),
af'd mem., 1 N.Y.2d 750, 152 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1956); Bostow, J., dissenting in the appellate
division, at 432:
No matter how "intelligent, just and fair" twelve jurors may have been, no cautionary words of the court could subtract from the fact that they were plainly told
that the plaintiff could proceed against the present defendant and thereby the plaintiff did not lose his rights to compensation. ... While the court did instruct the jury
that they should not take all of this into consideration, it seems to me that it would be
naive to believe that they did not do so.
180. Emich v. Citizens' Trust & Sav. Bank, 321 Ill. 518, 152 N.E. 580 (1926).
181. People v. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d 359, 197 N.E.2d 436 (1964).
182. Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U.S. 361 (1894), relying on dicta in Hopt v. Utah, 120 US.
430 (1887).
183. Copiah Dairies v. Addkison, 153 So. 2d 689 (Miss. 1963).
184. Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 375 U.S. 34 (1963).
185. Colquett v. Williams, 264 Ala. 214, 86 So. 2d 381 (1956); Ridgeway v. North Star
Terminal & Stevedoring Co., 378 P.2d 647 (Alaska 1963); Lobalzo v. Varoli, 409 Pa. 15, 185
A.2d 557 (1962); contra, Miller v. Alvey, 194 N.E.2d 747 (Ind. App. Ct. 1963).
186. Surface v. Bentz, 238 Pa. 610, 77 Ati. 922 (1910).
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If any trend can be distilled from the cases in which appellate judges
leave open the escape valve of judicial therapy, as compared with those
in which they seem to recognize the "unmitigated fiction" of which
Mr. Justice Jackson spoke, it is a trend toward realism. But realism here
has two implications. In one sense it is realistic to conclude that jurors
usually do not lose their prejudice just because they are told to lose it.
Many of the recent opinions demonstrate that kind of realism. But it is
also realism to notice that re-trials have a disastrous effect on trial court
dockets already overloaded with cases yet to be tried the first time.
There comes a point at which the appellate judge must ask himself:
This is bad, but is it bad enough to put the court system and these
litigants through the expense and time and stress of another trial? 8 7
The researcher, who need not, fortunately, answer the question,
looks out from the safe harbor of a policy judgment and concludes that
the appellate court is the poorest of all places for the correction of
prejudice. There has to be a better way to carry out the reform.
D. No Prejudice
Faced with a well-made record, filled with the appropriate objections
and motions for new trial, clear of the taint of invited prejudice and
of the possibility that the appellate judges will avoid reversal by finding
a therapeutic instruction, the appellant from prejudice faces his most
imposing task: He must demonstrate to the judges that the jury was
prejudiced. The judges have one escape valve left; they can find that
it was not. This is a decision they can reach in one of two ways (to
borrow Judge Doe's lexicon): by asking whether there was prejudice
as a matter of law; or by asking if there was prejudice as a matter of
88
fact.
There is a substantial body of authority for the generalization that
decisions as to the fact of jury prejudice are to be made in the first
instance by the trial judge; recent opinions from the Oregon Supreme
Court are conspicuous in expressly endorsing this point of view, but
they are not alone if the reader is willing, with Judge Doe, to equate
question-of-fact and "trial judge discretion."'1 9 Admittedly, generous
187. Durkin v. Lewitz, 3 Ill. App. 2d 481, 123 N.E.2d 151 (1954); Gall v. Gall, 114 N.Y.
109, 21 N.E. 106 (1889). Both opinions suggest the importance of policy considerations
relating to the efficient administration of justice.
188. Reid, A Peculiar Mode of Expression (Judge Doe's Use of the Distinction Between
Law and Fact), 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q. 427, 429; see Part Ill-B infra. To the extent that the
question is one of fact, deference to the trial judge's "discretion" will be more appropriate,
if not more likely to come about, than if the question is one of law.
189. Reid. supra note 188; Part III-B, infra; Skeeters v. Skeeters, 389 P.2d 313 (Ore.
1964); Martin v. Dretsch, 380 P.2d 788 (Ore. 1963); see also Boettger v. Babcock & Wilcox
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appellate deference arises most often when the prejudicial incident is
mild or ambiguous-as, for instance, in a 1961 Tennessee opinion,
where the appellee's lawyer had read law to the jury in his final argument; 19 0 or, in a Pennsylvania criminal obscenity case, where the prosecutor referred to the defendant's magazine as a "scandal sheet . . .
only for the purpose of appealing to the lowest instincts of men .... ";191
or where the voir dire question is only slightly improper; 92 or where
the plaintiff's lawyer took advantage of his jury argument to deliver a
sentimental valedictory address to the community.19 3 However some
instances of appellate deference involve more serious prejudice. In
Clark v. Essex Wire Corp.,9 4 the plaintiff's lawyer mentioned the
amount of his damages prayer, in violation of a settled Pennsylvania
rule; the trial judge (the judicial novelist, Judge Curtis Bok) decided
that, since the defendant's complaint of prejudice turned on liability,
not on damages, the prejudice had not influenced the result. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court respected his conclusion.
The numerical majority of the opinions, though they do not allude
to a distinction between law and fact, decide the question of prejudice
as a question of law.' 95 The New York court once expressed its unwillingness to reverse for prejudice because that decision would "impede the public business," and because there was in the record an
opportunity to take refuge behind a therapeutic instruction. 196 (In this
the New York judges set-or followed-a common pattern; many of
the opinions find no prejudice because of a therapeutic instruction, first
implicitly admitting, of course, that there was prejudice to be removed
Co., 258 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1958); C. M. Spring Drug Co. v. United States, 12 F.2d 852 (8th
Cir. 1926); Brown v. McCuan, 56 Cal. App. 2d 85, 132 P.2d 838 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942); Neill
v. McGinn, 175 Neb. 369, 122 N.W.2d 65 (1963); Fields v. Creek, 21 Wis. 2d 562, 124 N.W.2d
599 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
190. McCandless v. Sammons, 50 Tenn. App. 413, 362 S.W.2d 259 (1961); see Muncie
Wheel & Jobbing Co. v. Finch, 150 Mich. 274, 118 N.W. 1107 (1907).
191. Commonwealth v. Donaducy, 167 Pa. Super. 611, 615, 76 A.2d 440, 442 (1950).
192. Goldstein v. Fendelman, 336 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1960).
193. Shea v. D. & N. Motor Transp. Co., 316 Mass. 553, 55 N.E.2d 950 (1944); see
Murray v. Hills Cab Co., 198 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963); Martin v. Dretsch, 234 Ore.
138, 380 P.2d 788 (1963).
194. 361 Pa. 60, 63 A.2d 35 (1949); Bullock v. Chester & Darby Telford Rd. Co., 270
Pa. 295, 113 Atl. 379 (1921) establishes the Pennsylvania rule forbidding mention of the
damages prayer to the jury. See also Burnett v. Bledsoe, 159 So. 2d 841 (Ala. 1964); Wills v.
J. J. Newberry Co., 48 Cal. App. 2d 595, 111 P.2d 346 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941); Jones v. Cary,
219 Ind. 268, 37 N.E.2d 944 (1941); Brown v. Parker, 375 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
195. See the federal criminal cases cited in note 150, supra, and Kelling v. United States,
121 F.2d 428 (8th Cir. 1941); Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1937); and
Stewart v. United States, 211 Fed. 41 (9th Cir. 1914).
196. Gall v. Gall, 114 N.Y. 109, 21 N.E. 106 (1889). Compare Erben v. Lorillard, 19 N.Y.
299 (1859), with People v. Smith, 104 N.Y. 491, 10 N.E. 873 (1887).
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by the instruction. 197) With more candor, some opinions admit that the
removal of prejudice is doubtful, but hold that sound policy requires
that an absence of prejudice be assumed. "[W]hen the record comes
to this court bearing the official sanction of the trial judge .... Every
reasonable presumption must be indulged in that the trial judge has
performed his duty...."19s
When appellate judges themselves determine the absence or presence
of prejudice, or decide on policy grounds to assume there was no
prejudice, they are making a determination of law; but the process is
a curious one, because in arriving at the legal result, the judges usually
weigh the evidence. 9 9 At times they do this either by determining
from their own sense of fairness, imposed on the record, whether the
verdict reflects prejudice, 200 or by looking at the experience and mentality of the average juror in terms of the decision and the evidence. If
the record demonstrates that the trial was, as the Nevada court put it
last year, "a one-sided affair," appellate judges typically affirm despite
the prejudice. 201 Especially where the liability decision is supported by
the evidence, the usual disposition is to affirm.202 A $900 verdict for injured sensibilities because of a mouse in a soft-drink bottle, for instance, was held not to reflect prejudice from irrelevant medical evi197. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451 (1880); Alabama Great So. R.R. v. Frazier,
93 Ala. 45, 9 So. 303 (1891); Wills v. J. J. Newberry Co., 43 Cal. App. 2d 595, 111 P.2d 346
(Dist. Ct. App. 1941); Hollingworth v. City of Fort Dodge, 125 Iowa 627, 101 N.W. 455
(1904); Temple v. State, 195 N.E.2d 850 (Ind. 1964); Oil Transp. Co. v. Pash, 191 Kan. 229,
380 P.2d 341 (1963) (one judge dissenting); Potts v. Krey, 362 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1962);
Busch v. Fisher, 89 Mich. 192, 50 N.W. 788 (1891); Santee v. Haggart Constr. Co., 202 Minn.
361, 278 N.W. 520 (1938); Holmes v. Moffat, 120 N.Y. 159, 24 N.E. 275 (1890); White v.
Standard Oil Co., 116 Ohio App. 212, 187 N.E.2d 504 (1962); Cummings v. Van Valin, 363
S.W.2d 385 (rex. Civ. App. 1962); Kelley v. Great No. Ry., 59 Wash. 2d 894, 371 P.2d

528 (1962).
198. North Chicago St. Ry. v. Cotton, 140 Ill. 486, 503, 29 N.E. 899, 904 (1892); see
Commonwealth v. Donaducy, 167 Pa. Super. 611, 76 A.2d 440 (1950).
199. Of course, judges also weigh evidence when the issue is whether to direct a verdict
or grant a motion for judgment N.O.V. Rust v. Reeher, 198 N.E.2d 783 (Ohio Ct. App.
1963), is an interesting and recent example of appellate evidence weighing.
200. C. M. Spring Drug Co. v. United States, 12 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1926); United States v.
Jones, 32 Fed. 569 (D.S.C. 1887); Williams v. City of Anniston, 257 Ala. 191, 58 So. 2d
115 (1952); Paliokaitis v. Checker Taxi Co., 324 Il. App. 21, 57 N.E.2d 216 (1944); Smith v.
Russ, 22 Wis. 439 (1868); see Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 315 F.2d 660 (5th Cir.),
rev'd, 375 U.S. 34 (1963); Martinez v. Moore, 34 Cal. Rptr. 606 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963);
Deerfield v. Northwood, 10 N.H. 269 (1839); Hamblett v. Hamblett, 6 N.H. 333 (1833).
201. Boyd v. Pernicano, 385 P.2d 342, 343 (Nev. 1963); some decisions find that prejudice
influenced damages, but did not influence the verdict on liability, and either grant a
limited new trial or a remittitur. See Part III-C, infra; James, Remedies for Excessiveness
or Inadequacy of Verdicts, 1 DUQUFSNE L. Rav. 143 (1963).
202. Big Ledge Copper Co. v. Dedrick, 21 Ariz. 129, 185 Pac. 825 (1919); Jacobson v.
National Dairy Prods. Corp., 32 Ill. App. 2d 37, 176 N.E.2d 551 (1961); Stillwater Milling
Co. v. Morehouse, 381 P.2d 1006 (Okla. 1963); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Sutton, 208
Okla. 488, 257 P.2d 307 (1953).
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dence. 20 3 A comparison between the verdict and the amount of the
prayer for damages would seem inapposite, in view of the casual manner in which many trial lawyers arrive at an ad damnum figure; still,
there is some recent authority for making the comparison. 20 4
These opinions evidence a reasoning process that begins with the
appellate judges' opinions of the things an average juror knows and
feels, and ends with the conclusion that the jury was or was not prejudiced because the tacitly hypothetical juror is a citizen who would or
would not have been influenced in the circumstances.2 0 5 In one case,
the defense lawyer performed an impromptu demonstration before the
jury to prove that a lighted cigarette would not ignite gasoline. The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma thought this not prejudicial because the
average juror already knows that trick.20 6 The Illinois Appellate Court
thought in 1961 that jurors would be more influenced than judges by
irrelevant accident testimony. 207 This jury-measuring device is often
expressed in terms of the appellate judge's laudable respect for the
intelligence and fairness of the average citizen. "By and large, they are
intelligent, just and fair, and it is reasonable to conclude that as jurors
they have not left behind them their common sense ....

,208 This finds

specific application in the case where an occurrence during the trial
indicates the jury was or was not influenced by probative evidence
more than by prejudice. In a New York Supreme Court opinion, for
instance, the fact that the jurors asked for repetition of probative
testimony indicated to the appellate judges that they were not influenced by prejudice; 209 on the other hand, where the key issue was
credibility of witnesses, the Illinois Appellate Court thought it likely
that prejudice may have influenced the jurors' decision.2 10 Some of the
203. Harris v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 35 Ill. App. 2d 406, 183 N.E.2d 56 (1962); see
Raymore v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 141 S.W.2d 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940); Hager v.
Bushman, 255 App. Div. 934, 8 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1938); City of Spokane v. Costello, 42 Wash.
182, 84 Pac. 652 (1906); Fields v. Creek, 21 Wis. 2d 562, 124 N.W.2d 599 (1963).
204. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 42 Ill. App. 2d
163, 191 N.E.2d 628 (1963).
205. Big Ledge Copper Co. v. Dedrick, 21 Ariz. 129, 185 Pac. 825 (1919); Durkin v.
Lewitz, 3 Ill. App. 2d 481, 123 N.E.2d 151 (1954); Busch v. Fisher, 89 Mich. 192, 50 N.W.
788 (1891); Murray v. Hills Cab Co., 198 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963); Stillwater
Milling Co. v. Morehouse, 381 P.2d 1006 (Okla. 1963); Martin v. Dretsch, 234 Ore. 138, 380
P.2d 788 (1963); Waterman v. Chicago & Alton R.R., 82 Wis. 613, 52 N.W. 247 (1892).
206. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Sutton, 208 Okla. 488, 257 P.2d 307 (1953).
207. Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill. App. 2d 323, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961) (dicta).
208. Nappi v. Falcon Truck Renting Corp., 286 App. Div. 123, 128, 141 N.Y.S2d 424,
428 (1955), aff'd mer., 1 N.Y.2d 750, 152 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1956); see Caley v. Manicke, supra,
note 207; Connecticut Ins. Co. v. T. C. Caummisar & Sons, 218 Ky. 378, 291 S.W. 776 (1927).
209. Galotti v. Deansboro Supply Co., 248 App. Div. 20, 289 N.Y. Supp. 535 (1936).
210. Panelle v. Chicago Transit Authority, 47 Ill.
App. 2d 119, 197 N.E.2d 501 (1964).
Compare Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), with United States v. O'Brien, 319
F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1963).
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determinations are not nearly that advertent and seem to turn on an
appellate determination that the prejudice did not influence the jurors
because it does not appear to the judges to have been serious. Hopt
v. Utah21' is a distinguished example; the Court thought that the prosecutor's saying that the case was the most remarkable he had ever tried
was more likely to help the defendant than to harm him. In another
category of cases, judges have determined that there was no prejudice
without indicating how they arrived at their decision; Nappi v. Falcon
Truck Renting Corp.21 2 illustrates this mysterious process better than
most opinions because Judge Bostow, dissenting, took his brethren to
task for using it. In People v. Horton, the trial judge, commenting on
the defendant's alibi witnesses, told the jury "the alibi testimony"
doesn't convince the court at all. Alibi witnesses are worth $2 a dozen
anyway. Anybody can prove an alibi if you've got some friends and
relatives that want to come in and swear." The Illinois Supreme Court
213
did not think that remark, "considered in context," was prejudicial.
One of the most remarkable examples of this non-reasoning occurred
this year in the Court of Appeals of Kentucky. In a suit for damages
to the plaintiff's car while it was in the defendant's gasoline station, the
trial court allowed an expert witness to testify to facts that implied
a leaky muffler set off the explosion which caused the damage. The
questions had been asked over objection and the plaintiff contended
they had prejudiced him. The court of appeals held that there was
no prejudice because the issue of holes in the muffler was irrelevant:
We are unable to understand how this muffler, holes or no holes,
or any muffler, had anything to do with the question of liability .... It was immaterial from what source the gasoline fumes
were ignited. Therefore, even if the questions concerning this
muffler were improper, they could have had no prejudicial
effect. 21 4
In assessing the minds and hearts of jurors, appellate judges are
without objective standards. They sometimes appear to abandon the
assumption that they are able to know how jurors react, and instead
apply their own attitudes. This may be understandable when they are
211. 120 U.S. 430 (1887). See also Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp., 39 Ill. App. 2d
73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1963).
212. 141 N.Y.S.2d 424, 430-32 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aff'd mem., 1 N.Y.2d 750, 152 N.Y.S.2d 297
(1956); his opinion relied upon Zimber v. Kress, 225 App. Div. 16, 2&2 N.Y. Supp. 46 (1928);
Regan v. Frontier Elevator & Mill Co., 211 App. Div. 164, 208 N.Y. Supp. 239 (1924); and

Posnick v. Crystal, 181 App. Div. 660, 168 N.Y. Supp. 868 (1918).
213. People v. Horton, 30 Ill. 2d 293, -, 196 N.E.2d 649, 650 (1964); see Faber v.
C. Reiss Coal Co., 124 Wis. 554, 102 N.W. 1049 (1905).
214. McKinley v. Danville Motors, Inc., 374 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Ky. 1964).
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reviewing prejudice which occurred before a trial judge sitting without
a jury, 215 but it is an approximate approach at best in reviewing jury
cases. It is expressed most often in reference to prejudicial conduct
which the judges, in their experience, find tame (the conclusion being
that, because it is tame to them it could not have prejudiced the jurors).
In Scott v. Campbell, for instance, the Ohio Court of Appeals thought
the jurors not prejudiced because the conduct in the trial court was
''mild and genteel in comparison with many we have heard and
read." 216 The Illinois Appellate Court, in a similar holding, noted that
the conduct complained of "was mild.., compared with other digressions from the straight and narrow path in the presentation of personal
injury cases. 217 Reviewing prejudiced verdicts is such a difficult business for appellate judges that writers in the ivory tower ought to show
them sympathy rather than sarcasm, but these we-don't-see-it-so-howcould-they-have-seen-it cases are painfully like the blind men in H. G.
Wells' story, who thought there was no sky because they could not
feel it with their hands. Cases in which the court concludes that
justice does not require reversal, without explaining why they have
reached this conclusion, are rarer than candid attempts to explain the
21 8
fact- or law-finding process; they are probably even less commendable.
With the development and refinement of devices which correct trial
errors, short of full-dress retrial of all issues, it may be that appellate
judges will appraise prejudiced verdicts more honestly and will avoid
questionable processes for finding an absence of prejudice, and the
other escape valves. 219 Remittitur is a traditional half-way point which,
because it avoids retrial in most cases, may occasion a franker review
of verdicts inflated by prejudice. 220 Its disadvantage is that it places
215. Broderick v. Torresan, 88 Cal. App. 2d 18, 198 P.2d 75 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948). The
trial judge had said that he did not intend to be influenced by the prejudicial information.
See also Swanson v. Chase, 107 Ga. App. 295, 129 S.E.2d 873 (1963).
216. 115 Ohio App. 208, 212, 184 N.E.2d 485, 488 (1961); see Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Smith, 107 Ga. App. 384, 130 S.E.2d 355 (1963); City of Portland v. Holmes, 232 Ore. 505,
376 P.2d 120 (1962).
217. Durkin v. Lewitz, 3 Ill. App. 2d 481, 494-95, 123 N.E.2d 151, 158 (1954). See also
Eizerman v. Behn, 9 Ill. App. 2d 263, 132 N.E.2d 788 (1956).
218. Gall v. Gall, 114 N.Y. 109, 21 N.E. 106 (1889); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Sutton,
208 Okla. 488, 257 P.2d 307 (1953); City of Shawnee v. Sparks, 26 Okla. 665, 110 Pac. 884
(1910).
219. The discipline of the Bar is a largely untried alternative. See Part III-D, infra;
Durkin v. Lewitz, 3 Il. App. 2d 481, 495, 123 N.E.2d 151, 158 (1954) ("[I]n this day when
courts are overwhelmed with this type of practice and three or four years is required to
bring a personal injury case to trial, it behooves those who practice in that branch of the
profession to direct their attention with rigid self-discipline to the fair presentation of

their case. ...'.
220. Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Carter, 202 Ark. 1026, 154 S.W.2d 824 (1941); Brabeck v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 117 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1962), noted at 12 DEraEsE L.J. 228 (1963);
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on appellate judges the burden of deciding, as the Wisconsin court put
it, "the lowest amounts which an unprejudiced jury acting reasonably
would probably award." 221 Further, there is the problem of deciding
whether prejudice infects both a verdict on liability and a verdict on
damages and at what point the infection can be excised without disturbing the finding on liability.22 2 This difficulty may be cured as
divided trials ab initio become more common.2 3
III. SOLUTIONS

The only completely effective solution for the problem of prejudiced
jurors is a disciplined Bar which is as diligent to provide fair trials
as the judiciary is. If that kind of Bar existed, appellate and trial judges
could order retrials of all cases in which jurors might have been
prejudiced by an accidental occurrence; the retrial load would undoubtedly be lighter than it is now. Discipline is largely an untested
solution. It has not been used frequently by trial or appellate judges
to limit and eliminate prejudiced verdicts. To some extent, pretrial
devices have been used. To a greater extent, appellate judges have
encouraged the use of vigorous efforts to avoid and mitigate prejudice
during trial. Finally, appellate courts, especially in recent years, have
attempted to make wider use of limited reversals for new trial. These
three categories of remedy are discussed in this Part, along with a final
section analyzing past and present attempts to achieve fairer trials
through sanctions visited directly on offending lawyers.
A. Solutions Before Trial
Modem trial procedure has at its command all of the weapons for
efficient, flexible administration of justice that a century of reform
could give it. It ought to be able to accomplish now what courts have
always pretended therapeutic instructions do. The only sure way to
State v. Jansen, 207 Minn. 250, 290 N.W. 557 (1940); Fowler Butane Gas Co. v. Varner, 244
Miss. 130, 141 So. 2d 226 (1962). The subject is discussed generally at 12 DEr.NsE L.J. 521
(1963); see also James, supra, note 201.
221. Sandeen v. Willow River Power Co., 214 Wis. 166, 186, 252 N.W. 706, 714 (1934).
222. Ryan v. Roberts, 2 App. Div. 2d 936, 156 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1956); Graham v. Morris,
366 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Waterman v. Chicago & Alton R.R., 82 Wis. 613,
52 N.W. 247 (1892). The same issue faces the judge granting a new trial limited to the issue
of damages.
223. The standards are always applied more realistically in capital criminal cases. See
State v. Strong, 119 Ohio App. 31, 196 N.E.2d 801 (1963). To some extent this is true of
trials for lesser crimes; see, e.g., Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). Where trial
judge misconduct is the source of prejudice, appellate judges may be more stringent than
they are where the prejudice comes from lawyers-perhaps because they think deference
is less appropriate. See Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 826 (1964).
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eliminate prejudice is to see to it that prejudicial information never
reaches the eyes and ears of the jury. The time to eliminate prejudice,
if lawyers will not exercise the professional self-control that professional ethics enjoin upon them, is before trial. There are three pretrial
devices which can be marshalled to this end: (1) the motion to strike
allegations in pleadings, which will carry with it, if sustained, the
court's determination that evidence to prove the striken allegations
is inadmissible; (2) the pretrial order, following an effective pretrial
conference in which each side discloses the facts surrounding possible
prejudicial testimony; (3) the ill-defined pretrial motion to suppress
evidence.
A sustained motion to strike allegations in a pleading is neither as
efficient nor as broad as a pretrial order, but it at least advises lawyers
that some of the testimony they planned to use is irrelevant. In Ridgeway v. North Star Terminal & Stevedoring Co.,224 the Alaska Supreme

Court considered an oral pretrial ruling that the defendant could not
prove that the plaintiff's employer carried workmen's compensation
insurance. The defendant asked questions on this point anyway, and
made other mention of workmen's compensation. The appellate judges
thought the conduct so serious that a new trial was required, despite
forceful and detailed therapeutic instructions. (Query: How would
they have ruled had no pretrial ruling been made?)
The court's opinion is largely a written lecture to the trial judge.
The court said, among other things, that its pretrial rule 225 provided
a better means for dealing with prejudicial evidence questions than an
oral motion on a pleading. "A written pretrial order would have settled
the matter."' 6 In an even more significant part of the lecture, the
court suggested that violation of the pretrial order would have justified
strong reprisal: "Deliberate breach of the rule by counsel would be
grounds for disciplinary action by the court and imposition of costs
in the event of mistrial."2 27 This is significant when one considers that
the usual appellate treatment of misconduct by lawyers is the punishment of clients.
The language of modem court rules on pretrial conferences permits
the question of prejudicial evidence to be part of the agenda, if the
facts involved are not seriously controverted, and if the lawyers will
disclose them. The Indiana rule, for example, permits pretrial con224. 378 P.2d 647 (Alaska 1963).
225. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 16, which is substantially the same as FED. R. Civ. P. 16 as to
matters which can be taken up at a pretrial conference and settled in a pretrial order.
226. 378 P.2d 647, 650 (Alaska 1963).
227. Ibid.
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sideration of questions concerning the elimination of unnecessary evidence, as well as consideration of "such other matters as may expedite
the determination of the action." 228 The federal rule permits consideradon of anything that "may aid in the disposition of the action" and
contemplates a rule which "when entered controls the subsequent
course of the action ...."229
The effectiveness of a pretrial conference and order varies directly
with the amount of disclosure lawyers are willing to make during the
conference. Given disclosure, one of the results of the conference "is
to take cases from the realm of surprise and maneuvering whereby an
unwary counsel might see the just cause of his client lost. '230 On the
other hand, a pretrial conference of more routine dimensions, in which
eminent prejudice is known to both sides and discussed by neither, is
an exercise in futility. In Beck v. Wings Field, Inc.,23 1 the plaintiff
planned to offer an expert witness on landing fields who was prepared
to say that his airplane had crashed in the same place the plaintiff's
airplane crashed. Both sides obviously knew this witness was prepared
to say this. (The defendant's lawyer tried during trial to keep the
question from being asked, and failed.) The testimony got into the
record, and the trial judge gave an emphatic therapeutic instruction
to the jury, which, the appellate judges held, was insufficient to cure
the harm. The appellate opinion notes that a pretrial conference was
held; if the crucial expert testimony had been discussed at that conference, an expensive appeal and second trial might have been avoided.
In Carlock v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 2

2

the plaintiffs' lawyers

anticipated questions at trial, from the defense, which would suggest
personal and immoral relations between the plaintiffs. During a pretrial conference, they asked the court to rule on the admissibility of the
testimony and, if it were admissible, for permission to call rebuttal
witnesses on the point. The defense lawyers contended it was not a
proper place to decide the question; the trial judge ruled against the
expected evidence and in favor of discussing prejudicial evidence
before trial.
The motion before trial to suppress prejudicial testimony is apparently a distant cousin of the criminal rule permitting pretrial sup228. IND. Sup. Or. R. 1-4(e).
229. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(6).
230. Chemey v. Holmes, 185 F.2d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 1950). Pretrial disclosure can be
helpful, too, in the preparation of cases for trial; see HICKAM & SCANLON, PREPARAMON FOR
TRAL 209-10 (1963).
231. 122 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1941).
232. 8 FrED. RuLFS SERv. 16.261, Case 1 (E.D. Tenn. May 8, 1944).
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pression of illegally seized evidence. 23 3 Many appellate courts will not
permit it in civil cases; 234 a few have endorsed it,215 and a few others
leave the propriety of the motion to the trial judge.286 The device in
form is similar to the motion to strike allegations in pleadings but in
operation is similar to a pretrial evidence order; those courts which
have endorsed or permitted it have also suggested that the order,
whatever its form, confines the trial as much as a pretrial order
would. 2 7 This emphasis may require lawyers to adhere to specific pretrial rulings more diligently than they have adhered to the rules of
evidence and the ethics of advocacy.
Any one of these three pretrial devices is obviously superior to waiting (as the 19th Century judges supposed a lawyer should) until a prejudicial issue explodes in the presence of a jury. But, even when the
issue appears at that crucial moment, it may be possible to obtain a
288
ruling, out of the jury's presence, barring prejudicial information.
This was tried unsuccessfully by the defense lawyer in the Beck case.
Still, many courts seem more accustomed to the device than they are
to the motion before trial to suppress evidence. 239 The new Code of
Trial Conduct of the American College of Trial Lawyers endorses
it,240 and the federal district court in New York once suggested that
it is preferable to a pretrial motion to strike pleadings. That case,
Minneapolis Gasoline & Fuel Co. v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., involved a
civil antitrust complaint which would have informed the jury of
criminal action against the same defendants. The defense moved to
strike the allegations and was overruled: "[T] he defendants may take
appropriate steps before the trial judge to prevent the plaifitiff's
reading these allegations to a jury ... "241
B. Solutions During Trial
There is a long-standing tradition in the review of trial judges that
deference be made to their superior ability to observe and deal with
occurrences during the trial. Dean Wigmore devoted much of his
enormous energy urging that the deference be given greater play than
233. FEr. R. Caim. P. 41(e).
234. Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 1087, 1092-95 (1964).
235. Id. at 1095-96; State v. Baker Bros. Nursery, 366 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1963).
236. Annot., supra note 234, at 1097-98.
237. Ibid.; Burnett v. Hernandez, 263 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1959).
238. Martin v. Miles, 41 Ill. App. 2d 208, 190 N.E.2d 473 (1963); Garbell v. Fields, 36 Ill.
App. 2d 399, 184 N.E.2d 750 (1962).
239. See Annot., supra note 234.
240. American College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct (1963), reprinted at 32
J. BAR. ASS'N KAN. 117 (1963-64).
241. 2 F.R.D. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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it had in his day, and modem judges appear to agree with him.242 In
one sense this deference to trial judges is, as Mr. Justice Jackson said,
"unmitigated fiction," which is illustrated best by the number of
opinions which dispose of prejudice contentions by noting that the
judge gave a routine instruction to disregard them. In another sense
-and this must be the sense in which Dean Wigmore wrote on the
subject-the principle is nothing more than a recognition of the fact
that a cold record is an imperfect way to understand what occurred
before the jury.
When prejudice is charged, a trial judge has a duty to rule correctly
(to find facts accurately) on objections to prejudicial conduct, motions
to strike it, motions for instructions on it, and motions for mistrial
because of it. This is the area appellate judges identify, normally, when
they talk about trial judge discretion. But, prior to the fact-finding
duty, the trial judge has a duty to act on his own motion to keep the
trial fair, and a duty to act effectively to reduce prejudice, when he
responds to a motion. The two functions are analytically distinct.
1. The Duty to Act Effectively
"It is always the duty of a trial court to control proceedings to
insure .. . a fair and impartial triMl, '243 the Illinois court said this
year, reversing a trial judge who did not intervene on his own motion
to prevent the introduction of prejudicial evidence. There seems to
be a consensus among judges, at both the trial244 and appellate 245 levels,
that reversal is justified if conduct occurs which would justify a mistrial, were the motion for mistrial made, and the trial judge fails to
intervene on his own motion. "[L]ike other difficult and delicate
duties, it must be performed by those upon whom the law imposes
it"; interference by the trial judge "is due to truth and justice."2 46 This
is no more than one aspect of a trial judge's broader duty to exercise
242. Judge Spencer A. Gard, the author of the current edition of JONES, EvMENCE, has
expressed that opinion, and it was also found to be the opinion of most of the trial judges
of Indiana. See Shaffer, Bullets, Bad Florins,and Old Boots: A Report of the Indiatia Trial
Judges Seminar on the Judge's Control Over Demonstrative Evidence, 39 NoTaE DAME
LAW. 20, 33 (1963).
243. People v. Bernette, 30 IIl. 2d 359, -, 197 N.E.2d 436, 444 (1964), a criminal case;
see also Cross v. State, 68 Ala. 476 (1881).
244. Shaffer, supra note 242, at 33.
245. Altenbaumer v. Lion Oil Co., 186 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914
(1951); C. M. Spring Drug Co. v. United States, 12 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1926); Ethridge v.
Goyer Co., 241 Miss. 333, 131 So. 2d 188 (1961); Swanson v. Evans Oil, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d
875, 209 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1961); Nappi v. Falcon Truck Renting Corp., 286 App. Div. 123, 141
N.Y.S.2d 424 (1955), aff'd mem., 1 N.Y.2d 750, 152 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1956); Colorado Interstate
Gas Co. v. Long, 372 P.2d 220 (Okla. 1962).
246. Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 294 (1878).
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control of the proceedings before him, regardless of what lawyers in
24 7
the case do.

When the trial judge acts, whether or not at
he cannot hope to mitigate prejudice unless he
dicial remarks, for instance, should be stopped
from the bench; sustaining objections to them

the behest of a party,
acts decisively. Prejuwith "fitting rebuke"
is not enough. "The

least that a self-respecting court can do . . . is to stop such practice

in the presence of the jury, and not allow it to proceed with simply
a perfunctory sustaining of objections. ' 248 Where the lawyer's conduct
is reprehensible enough-the "golden rule" jury argument was in a
recent Mississippi case 4 9-the trial judge is justified in being emphatic
when he rules on an objection to it, possibly he should explain to the
jury, as Dean Wigmore suggested, the reason behind the rule which
prevents the argument.2 50 Perfunctory or sarcastic instructions when
prejudice arises have been condemned often enough2 51 that trial judges
should stand warned that they must take seriously the fiction of therapy
by instruction, even when no one else does.
Not only should the trial judge act decisively, but he must act
promptly. There is in appellate opinions sometimes a tacit2 52 recognition and sometimes an express declaration2 13 that prejudicial misconduct is worse when it has time to set in. In two recent opinions,
one from Rhode Island 254 and one from Florida, trial judges have
been reversed apparently because they failed to give therapeutic
instructions at the time the prejudice occurred, the Florida court
noting that "it has been uniformly held that the Court should act
2'
immediately to appropriately instruct the jury.

55

There are, of course, situations where comment from the trial judge
aggravates an already bad situation-comment on a casual mention of
liability insurance seems to be an example. A Missouri trial judge
247. Bumette v. Hernandez, 263 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1959); Brabeck v. Chicago & N.W.
Ry., 117 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1962); State v. Jansen, 207 Minn. 250, 290 N.W. 557 (1940).
248. Sullivan v. Collins, 107 Wis. 291, 298, 83 N.W. 310, 313 (1900).
249. Copiah Dairies, Inc. v. Addkison, 153 So. 2d 689 (Miss. 1963).
250. Ibid.; 1 WIGMORF, EVmENcE 250-51 (3d ed. 1940); McJunkin v. Kiner, 157 Pa. Super.
578, 43 A.2d 608 (1945).
251. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Long, 372 P.2d 220 (Okla. 1962); Surface v. Bentz,
228 Pa. 610, 77 Ad. 922 (1910).
252. Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U.S. 361 (1895); Rosa v. City of Chester, 278 F.2d 876
(3d Cir. 1960); Altenbaumer v. Lion Oil Co., 186 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1950); McJunkin v.
Kiner, 157 Pa. Super. 578, 43 A.2d 608 (1945).
253. Holmes v. Moffat, 120 N.Y. 159, 24 N.E. 275 (1890); contra, Smith v. Whitman, 88
Mass. (6 Allen) 562 (1863), and authorities cited.
254. Deighan v. E. Turgeon Constr. Co., 182 A.2d 446 (R.I. 1962).
255. Seminole Shell Co. v. Clearwater Flying Co., 156 So. 2d 543, 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1963).
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showed admirable awareness of this danger when, after the offending
lawyer made a prejudicial remark, and the offended lawyer repeated
it in objecting, the judge said: "'If the jury heard any such remark,
they will disregard it.'"256 As Judge Frank said, "[T]he judge's cautionary instruction may do more harm than good: It may emphasize
the jury's awareness of the censured remark-as in the story, by Mark
Twain, of the boy told to stand in the corner and not think of a white
elephant. 257 Where the judge needlessly repeats the prejudicial language he may find that his brothers on the appellate bench think he
2
did more harm than good; he may fare better if he says nothing.

58

The trial lawyer sometimes "pulls down the house on his own
head"2 59 and tempts the trial judge to be over-emphatic in an effort
to preserve fairness. When that is the case, he gets small comfort in the
appellate courts 60 An especially vociferous rejoinder from the judge
is not only justified but is required if the conduct of the lawyer involved is seriously or deliberately prejudicial 2 6 1 This seems to be especially true where the lawyer is ignoring the court's previous ruling
on the subject.262 On the other hand, jurors place great weight on the
trial judge's attitude. Although he safely can be aggressive if he has
accurately identified what the lawyer is doing, if he has mistaken the
lawyer's tactics or if he misinterprets the law, his strong words are
2
almost certain to result in reversal.

63

2. Trial Judge Discretion
The discretion of a trial court, according to New Hampshire's Judge
Doe, is another name for a question of fact that is not decided by the
jury. When an appellate court defers to the judgment of a trial judge,
and says it is doing so because the trial judge has "discretion" on the
point, it is saying that a fact question is involved, and that the trial
judge is in a better position to decide the fact-the fact of prejudice in
256. McCandless v. Manzella, 369 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Mo. 1963); see Broeder, *The
University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. Ray. 774 (1959).
257. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 656 (2d Cir. 1946) (dissenting
opinion); see McJunkin v. Kiner, 157 Pa. Super. 578, 43 A.2d 608 (1945).
258. Harper v. James, 191 N.E.2d 504 (Ind. App. 1963); Brown v. Parker, 375 S.W.2d 594
(Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Surface v. Bentz, 228 Pa. 610, 77 Atl. 922 (1910).
259. Hirshberger v. Sinning, 21 Ohio App. 17, 22, 152 N.E. 908, 910 (1925).
260. Darrow v. Pierce, 91 Mich. 63, 51 N.W. 813 (1892); Hein v. Mildebrant, 134 Wis.
582, 115 N.W. 121 (1908). See generally, Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 826, 857-60 (1964).
261. Schafer v. Thurston Mfg. Co., 48 R.I. 244, 137 At. 2 (1927).
262. Daudel v. Wolf, 30 S.D. 409, 138 N.W. 814 (1912).
263. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 316 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1963); Atlantic Ref. Co. v.
Jones, 70 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1934); Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954);
Parris v. Deering S.W. Ry., 227 S.W. 1071 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921).
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this context-than the appellate court is.264 This, at least, is a convenient way to analyze the problem of trial judge discretion in the
context of jury prejudice, particularly when one reflects, with Professor James, that the verbal formulations involved have not changed
2
since the 18th Century

65

Deference to a trial judge's finding of fact on jury prejudice is most
immediately apparent in the cases affirming an order for new trial;
there is a special judicial rule on declarations against interest at work
in these cases. Appellate judges seem to assume that if the prejudice
was so bad that the judge below is willing to impose the ordeal of
another trial on himself, they ought to let him do it. The case where
an issue of pure fact is decisive illustrates the point. In Huffman v.
Heagy,26 6 the Florida court this year sustained an order for new trial
entered after the judge found in the jury room a newspaper reporting
the case. In McCandless v. Manzella,26 7 the Missouri court last year

affirmed a new trial order based on the impact of prejudicial conduct
-a side remark attributing Mafia influence to the plaintiff.
There is, however, a broader sort of appellate respect at work heresomething nearer what Judge Doe had in mind when he equated trial

judge discretion with fact-finding. 268 In Ward v. Hopkins, 26 9 for in-

stance, the trial judge ordered a new trial because he was afraid that
admonishing an erring lawyer would prejudice the verdict and aware
that a failure to admonish him would be equally harmful. The appellate court deferred to this judge's ability to measure the tone of voice
used by lawyers, the expression on the faces of the jurors, and all of
the other factors that might have produced or indicated an unfair trial.
In King v. Chicago Ry., 270 the Iowa court deferred to the trial judge's

determination of the effect of improper impeaching testimony on much
264. Reid, A PeculiarMode of Expression (Judge Doe's Use of the Distinction Between
Law and Fact), 1963 WAsH. U.L.Q. 427, 429.
265. James, Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts, 1 DuQU.SNE L. RKnv.
143, 146 (1963).
266. 159 So. 2d 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
267. 369 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. 1963).
268. This is best illustrated by the wrangles that result when appellate judges try to
guess what influenced a jury. In Goforth v. Alvey, 263 S.W.2d 313 (rex. Civ. App. 1953),
the trial judge had permitted a doubtful argument; the issue was what influence it had.
The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas thought the argument prejudiced the verdict. The
Supreme Court of Texas, three judges dissenting, disagreed and reversed. Altogether the
supreme court used 13 pages of quotations from the record and protested at great length
their conflicting views weighing, not the amount of prejudice, which would be hard
enough to measure, but its effect on twelve other people. 153 Tex. 449, 271 S.W.2d 404
(1954).
269. 81 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1955).
270. 138 Iowa 625, 116 N.W. 719 (1908).
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the same ground. The appellate holdings which follow similar reasoning,271 when contrasted with the infrequent case where the trial judge
is reversed, 272 indicate that the attitudes displayed in these recent
opinions are almost universal when an order granting a new trial is
being reviewed.
The question is closer when the trial judge has denied a motion for
new trial. But here again, when the issue turns on a finding of fact,
273
appellate judges tend to defer to his judgment. In Jones v. Cary,
for instance, the issue was whether the jurors heard a recess reference
to liability insurance; the trial judge decided that they did not, and
he was affirmed. In Marshallv. State, 274 the issue was whether the jurors

had been affected by the trial judge's suspending the defendant's
lawyer from practice; the trial judge, who was affirmed, held that they
had not. In Sandeen v. Willow River Power Co.,2

75

the issue was

whether the jurors had been influenced by an attempted subornation;
the trial judge, who was affirmed, held that they had not. In these
cases, the ultimate issue was prejudice, but the narrow issue-the fact
question-was whether a particular occurrence had an effect on the
jury. In each case, the appellate judges deferred to the trial judge's
determination of that fact; it is the trial judge who has his finger
on the pulse of the situation, as the Maryland court put it.276 This
result, of course, assumes that, if he applies any express fact-finding
standard at all, the trial judge applies a standard approved by the
277
appellate court. Mr. Justice Rutledge's opinion in the Kotteakos
case, which might appear to contradict the generalization from these
finger-on-the-pulse holdings, turns on the standard applied to determine
2 78
the fact, rather than on the finding of fact itself.

Where the issue is prejudice. in a broader sense, or prejudice as a
cumulative effect, appellate courts often defer to the trial judge's
271. Roberts v. Hyland Builders Corp., 34 Ill. App. 2d 276, 181 N.E.2d 197 (1962);
Jacobson v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 32 I1. App. 2d 37, 176 N.E.2d 551 (1961);
Phillips v. Vrooman, 361 Mo. 1098, 251 S.W.2d 626 (1952); Greathouse v. Wolff, 360 S.W.2d
297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); Thomas v. Belingloph, 362 S.W.2d 780 (Mo. CL App. 1962);
Nash v. Hiller, 380 P.2d 77 (Okla. 1960).
272. Neill v. McGinn, 175 Neb. 369, 122 N.W.2d 65 (1963).
273. 219 Ind. 268, 37 N.E.2d 944 (1941).
274. 5 Tex. Crim. App. 273 (1878).
275. 214 Wis. 166, 252 N.W. 706 (1934).
276. Bailey v. Wray, 230 Md. 859, 187 A.2d 101 (1963); see Commonwealth v. Donaducy,
167 Pa. Super. 611, 76 A.2d 440 (1950); Faber v. C. Reiss Coal Co., 124 Wis. 554, 102 N.W.
1049 (1905).
277. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
278. Fields v. Creek, 21 Wis. 2d 562, 124 N.W.2d 599 (1963), suggests another kind of
trial judge discretion. The court held the trial judge entitled to deference in allowing
the side offended by prejudice to attempt to balance it.
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finding of fact, but they apparently do it with somewhat less conviction. The impression is at times unavoidable that they use trial judge
discretion as an excuse for avoiding a difficult decision. 279 But the force
of a plausible finding of no-prejudice at the trial level is potent before
appellate judges and, excuse or not, the appellant who relies on prejudicial misconduct has an up-hill fight to reversal.2 80 The underlying
rationale of this apparent reliance on trial judge discretion is not
always a simple deference to a finding of fact. The appellate court
often adds its own estimate of the weight of the evidence, 28 1or its own
28 2
assessment of the fairness of the verdict.
In cases which do not support this generalization-those holding the
trial judge abused his discretion-Judge Doe probably would have said
that the trial judge made a finding of fact against the weight of the
record. The cases suggest that this statement is a reasonable generalization.283 Especially where the prejudice has come about through
an initially incorrect ruling by the trial judge (which he has attempted
to correct with therapy by instruction), appellate courts are inclined to
find against him. Here again, there is at work a judicial rule on
28 4
declarations against interest.
3. The Problem of an Inadequate Record
In his popular biography of Clarence Darrow, 28 5 Irving Stone lamented the fact that American trial courts do not make records of jury
speeches. In Darrow's case, this judicial oversight was an offense against
literature. In the more prosaic milieu of modern trial practice it is an
offense against the administration of justice and a refuge for appellate
judges.
When appellate judges complain that they have an inadequate record
they either mean that the record before them does not contain substantial portions of what went on before the jury, or that it contains
only words and not the wordless color that lends meaning to the words.
279. Burnett v. Bledsoe, 159 So. 2d 841 (Ala. 1964).
280. North Chicago St. Ry. v. Cotton, 140 Ill. 486, 29 N.E. 899 (1892); Connelly v. Nolte,
237 Iowa 114, 21 N.W.2d 311 (1946); State v. Gadbois, 89 Iowa 25, 56 N.W. 1107 (1907);
Skeeters v. Skeeters, 389 P.2d 313 (Ore. 1964); Fields v. Creek, 21 Wis. 2d 562, 124 N.W.2d
599 (1963).
281. George, Weeks & Co. v. Swafford, 75 Iowa 491, 39 N.W. 804 (1888); Loncar v.
National Fire Ins. Co., 84 Mont. 141, 274 Pac. 844 (1929); Boyd v. Pernicano, 385 P.2d 342
(Nev. 1963).
282. Beck v. Wings Field, Inc., 122 F.2d 114 (3d Cir. 1941); Wills v. J. J. Newberry Co.,
43 Cal. App. 2d 595, 111 P.2d 346 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
283. Ibid.; Lukich v. Angeli, 31 Ill. App. 2d 20, 175 N.E.2d 796 (1961).
284. Waldron v. Waldron, 156 U.S. 361 (1895); Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887);
contra, Smith v. Whitman, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 562 (1863).
285. STONE, CLARENCE DARtow FOR THE DEFENsE (1941).
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Neither observation is made with great frequency in the opinions.
The latter, always applicable, probably is made most often in those
cases in which the court is not disposed to reverse anyway. Often the
trial judge himself will not be able to recall the details of a disputed
28 6
incident well enough to rule intelligently on post-trial motions.
Some judges or lawyers apparently attempt to correct the deficiency
with unofficial recordings 7 ]Beyond that, there is a good deal of appellate guesswork. 288 Some courts place the burden of demonstrating accuracy on the party resisting a new trial. In Swift v. Wimberly,28 9 a
1963 opinion of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, the defendant contended that the plaintiff's lawyer had asked the "usual questions" about
liability insurance on voir dire examination and the appellate judges
accepted this as fact because the plaintiff's lawyer, on appeal, did not
show that it was not the fact. The case demonstrates, at least, that
appellate judges are not prevented from ruling because of an inadequate record if they are minded to rule, even to the point of using
mysterious devices for discovering facts not stated in the record. The
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas last year complained that a record
before it did not contain jury argument, then quoted part of the
argument and ruled on it.290
The fact that the techniques of making trial records, even when all
of the words are there, have not gone as far as Aldous Huxley's "feelies"
is a more pervasive limitation. 2 1 It can be a plausible basis for deference to the trial judge; many of the older cases find appellate judges
affirming a trial court's ruling on difficult questions of prejudice
precisely because they are unable, on appeal, to decide what effect
the prejudice had.2 9-2 Modem courts show a realistic tendency to assume
the worst. In McCandless v. Manzella,2 93 where remarks were made
which suggested the sinister influence of the Mafia on the side of the
plaintiff, the court assumed that the trial jury had heard the remarks,
286. E.g., Kane v. Sharples, 28 Pa. Dist. 900 (1919), where the trial judge refused to rule
on a post-trial motion based upon misconduct in an opening statement.
287. In Colquett v. Williams, 264 Ala. 214, 86 So. 2d 381 (1956), the jury speeches were
tape recorded.
288. E.g., Pool v. Day, 141 Kan. 195, 40 P.2d 396 (1935).
289. 370 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963); see Williams v. City of Anniston, 257 Ala. 191,
58 So. 2d 115 (1952).
290. Graham v. Morris, 266 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). Contra, McCandless v.
Sammons, 50 Tenn. App. 413, 362 S.W.2d 259 (1961).
291. HUXLEY, BRAvE Nav WoRaL 112-15 (Bantam ed. 1960).
292. McLain v. Atlas Assur. Co., 67 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934); Ogilvie v. Kansas
City Pub. Serv. Co., 27 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930); Henry v. Huff, 143 Pa. 548, 22 Atl.
1046 (1891); Schafer v. Thurston Mfg. Co., 48 R.I. 244, 137 At. 2 (1927); Dennis v. Hulse,
362 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1962).
293. 269 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Mo. 1963).
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even though the judge instructed the jury to disregard "any such remark" if they had heard it.
Whatever devices appellate judges use, inadequacies of record
generally have not proved an obstacle to appellate review of prejudicial conduct. As an excuse for affirming, limitation of the record occurs
far less often than absence of objection below, or therapeutic instruction given by the trial judge. This is largely because the lack of specific
language is supplied by uncontroverted bills of exception, 294 or by the
agreement of counsel for both sides in the appeal, 295 or by the trial
judge's account of what happened in a memorandum opinion written
to rule on post-trial motions. 29 6 Instances of controversy between the
lawyers involved are surprisingly rare. 29 7 When controversy does occur,
appellate judges often presume against prejudice in the absence of clear
record proof that it occurred. 29s "[W] hen the record comes to this court
bearing the official sanction of the trial judge .... [E]very reasonable
presumption must be indulged in that the trial judge has performed
his duty . . . unless such misconduct and its prejudicial nature are
clearly shown by the record." 299 Lawyers can, of course, obtain full
records of voir dire questions and jury arguments, if their clients are
willing to bear the expense of an extra reporter. The Iowa court, in
Connelly v. Nolte,30 0 rather pointedly warned the profession, however,
that records must be complete if they are prepared under the auspices
of a party; in that case the court refused to consider the transcript of
only one side of the jury argument.
C. Solutions in the Appellate Court
When all of the escape valves have been closed the appellate court's
problem in a prejudiced verdict case is to find a remedy that will
satisfy both justice and effective administration. The traditional appellate remedy-reversal for a full-dress retrial-is a burdensome expense
in states where personal injury trial dockets back up for five years or
294.
Alton
295.
296.

Swift v. Wimberly, 370 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963); Waterman v. Chicago &
R.R., 82 Wis. 613, 52 N.W. 247 (1892).
Williams v. City of Anniston, 257 Ala. 191, 58 So. 2d 115 (1952).
Colquett v. Williams, 264 Ala. 214, 86 So. 2d 381 (1956).

297. See, however, Schafer v. Thurston Mfg. Co., 48 R.I. 244, 137 At. 2 (1927), where
the appealing lawyers could not agree on their recollections of what the trial judge said.
The court affirmed, relying both on the inadequacy of the word record and on the fact
that it could not know the circumstances in which the words were spoken.
298. McLain v. Atlas Assur. Co., 67 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934); Ogilvie v. Kansas
City Pub. Serv. Co., 27 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930); see generally, Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d

826 (1964).

299. North Chicago St. Ry. v. Cotton, 140 Ill. 486, 503, 29 N.E. 899, 904 (1892).
800. 237 Iowa 114, 21 N.W.2d 311 (1946).
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more. The situation encourages the development of less sweeping
appellate remedies, such as the remittitur or the new trial confined to
the question of damages.3 0 1
The new trial on damages is a relatively recent development. 30 2 The
courts in most early cases, when faced with a record which indicated
a distorted verdict and either a clear case of liability, or a fair jury
case fairly tried, remanded for a new trial on all issues.30 3 More recently, a number of cases have displayed increased respect for a new
trial limited to the assessment of damages,30 4 and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure specifically permit the device. 30 5 Illinois cases provide an interesting example of the development of a rule under which
dissatisfied litigants like Melvin Cline are willing to seek review of
the adequacy of their verdicts with less fear of risking a new trial on
the merits. (The risk is not entirely gone, of course. No jurisdiction,
apparently, permits an appeal which limits the issue to damages. That
sort of appeal might become possible if modem reform toward separating damages and liability ab initio gains a significant following.)
As recently as 1955, the Illinois Supreme Court thought that a reversal
for retrial on damages alone impaired the litigant's right to jury trial
as much as additur would have. 30 But the same court, two years later,
overcame its early fears and held that, if damages are inadequate or
excessive, the weight of authority permits a new trial confined to the
issue of damages. The appellate court had endorsed the rule in principle but refused to apply it because it thought the record demonstrated a compromise of the liability issue; the supreme court disagreed
and ordered a new trial on damages only. The principle now seems
fully established in New Hampshire, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and
in the federal courts, and is gaining increased respect in other states.3 07
301. See James, Remedies for Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Verdicts, 1 DuQUESNE L.
Rav. 143 (1963) for a recent and valuable discussion of remittitur and additur.
302. Wilson, The Motion for New Trial Based on Inadequacy of Damages Awarded,
39 NEB. L. REv. 694 (1960). Mr. Wilson believes that most states will not permit the device,
but that most appellate judges are inclined to honor the trial judge's decision as to
whether it should be used.
303. Gordon v. Checker Taxi Co., 334 Il1. App. 313, 79 N.E.2d 632 (1948), and
authorities cited at 635; 325 Ill. App. 694, 60 N.E.2d 644 (1945); Browder v. Beckman, 275
Ill. App. 193 (1934).

304. E.g., Hose v. Hake, 412 Pa. 10, 192 A.2d 339 (1963); Wilson, supra note 302.
305. FED. R. Crv. P. 59(a): "A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
on all or part of the issues ......
306. Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 7 Ill. App. 2d 452, 130 N.E.2d 16 (1955),
rev'd in part, 10 Ill. 2d 28, 139 N.E.2d 275 (1957). The appellate court had been permitting
limited new trials at least since 1955. Hong v. Williams, 6 Ill. App. 2d 456, 128 N.E.2d 655
(1955). See also O'Brien v. Howe, 30 Ill. App. 2d 419, 174 N.E.2d 905 (1961); Kinsell v.
Hawthorne, 27 Ill. App. 2d 314, 169 N.X2d 678 (1960).
307. Rosa v. City of Chester, 278 F.2d 876 (3d Cir. 1960); George v. Smith, 105 N.H. 100,
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It is appropriate where the award has been swelled by prejudice, 0 8 as
well as-and this sort of case is more typical-where prejudice has
reduced the award.30 9 It is justified when the liability issues are so
clearly established by the evidence that appellate judges consider them
beyond dispute, 310 as well as in cases where the court feels that the
liability case was presented fairly and the verdict on liability has not
been affected by prejudice. 11 Of course, the measurement of prejudice
and the effect of prejudice is a precarious science, particularly in distinguishing between the effect prejudice had on liability and the effect
it had on injury; there is some tendency to respect trial judges when
they make an advertent determination of that fact issue.8 12
If the verdict indicates to the appellate judges a compromise on the
issue of liability, neither remittitur nor a new trial on damages is
appropriate. 313 This distinction accounted for some of the early deci31 4
sions which refused to adopt a rule permitting limited new trials,
and it accounts now for decisions in which a new trial is ordered on
all issues. 315 The test, imprecise as so many tests are when appellate
judges deal with prejudice, is whether or not the improper information
or conduct was a substantial factor in producing the jury's decision on
damages, as distinguished from its determination of liability.3 16 At
least in cases where the issue is whether or not the verdict has been
increased by prejudicial factors, a new trial confined to damages
promises an alternative to judges who feel that reversal is the only fair
result, but who are unwilling to make jurors of themselves and assess
a fair award through ordering a remittitur.l 17 Of course, there is no
193 A.2d 16 (1963); Blacktin v. McCarthy, 231 Minn. 303, 42 N.W.2d 818 (1950); Silveira
v. Murray, 192 A.2d 18 (R-1. 1963); see Wilson, supra note 302.
308. Rosa v. City of Chester, supra note 307.
309. See Part I-B, supra; O'Brien v. Howe, 30 Ill. App. 2d 419, 174 N.E.2d 905 (1961);
Wihr v. Bruno's Appliances Sales and Serv., Inc., 29 Ill. App. 2d 145, 172 N.E.2d 633
(1961).
310. Wihr v. Bruno's Appliances Sales and Serv., Inc., supra note 309; Blacktin v.
McCarthy, 231 Minn. 303, 42 N.W.2d 818 (1950).
311. Stroyeck v. A. E. Stanley Mfg. Co., 26 Il1. App. 2d 76, 167 N.E.2d 689 (1960).
312. E.g., ibid.
313. Wilson, supra note 302; James, supra note 301.
314. E.g., Luner v. Gelles, 314 MU.App. 659, 42 N.E.2d 313 (1942).
315. Kinsell v. Hawthorne, 27 Ill. App. 2d 314, 169 N.E.2d 678 (1960); Blacktin v.
McCarthy, 231 Minn. 303, 42 N.W.2d 818 (1950); see Rosa v. City of Chester, 278 F.2d
876 (3d Cir. 1960).
316. Rosa v. City of Chester, supra note 315, relying in part on Kottaekos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). Yerrick v. East Ohio Gas Co., 198 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio Ct. App.
1964), confines the data for consideration as to remittitur to the record and refuses to
consider verdicts in similar cases.
317. Wilson, supra note 302; see Waterman v. Chicago & Alton R.R., 82 Wis. 613,
52 N.W. 247 (1892), for the reverse situation. With rejection of additur as an impairment
of the right to jury trial see State Highway Comm'n v. Schmidt, 391 P.2d 692 (Mont.
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compelling reason against a court's ordering a new trial confined to
damages (in lieu of a complete new trial) conditioned on remittitur.31"
D. The Discipline of the Bar
1. The Myth of Good Faith
If courts are to continue to be places where justice is judicially
administered, causes must be fairly presented and fairly defended,
and the duty of counsel in this regard is not less important nor
less imperative than that of the judge.3 19
There is a superficial analogy between the lawyer in a civil lawsuit
who indulges in emotional drama for the benefit of a jury, or who
attempts by direct or covert means to bring incompetent evidence to
the jury's attention, and the police official who seizes evidence after
an illegal arrest or searches a suspect's home or automobile without a
warrant. There is a not so rational judicial response to these situations
which has translated a disapproval of methods into disapproval on the
merits of the cause before the court. It is now a general rule of constitutional law that criminal evidence seized in violation of the Bill
of Rights cannot be admitted against an accused; and, if it is admitted,
the trial judge commits reversible error. To a less pervasive extent,
appellate courts in civil lawsuits, faced with a calculating campaign
to improperly influence jurors, often have been convinced that the
solution was a reversal on the merits.
Still, the analogy is only superficial. The exclusionary rule of evidence which has become a matter of constitutional law in criminal
cases is based on the assumption that society can discipline its police.
The tendency of appellate judges to punish a civil client for his
lawyer's breach of ethics assumes that the loss of cases will cause
lawyers to behave. The assumption probably is unrealistic, but
whether it is or not, the civil client cannot discipline his lawyer as
society can discipline its police.
The appellate judge's penchant for visiting on a litigant the sins of
his lawyer presents itself in enforcing rules of evidence in civil cases
even more often than constitutional exclusion arises in criminal cases
-and with no more logic, incidentally, than client punishment has
when it arises in routine matters of judicial administration. 320 If, as
1964). A new trial limited to the issue of damages is apparently the only orthodox
alternative to a full-dress retrial.
318. See, e.g., Sandeen v. Willow River Power Co., 214 Wis. 166, 252 N.W. 706 (1934).
319. Saxton v. Pittsburg Rys., 219 Pa. 492, 495, 68 Ad. 1022, 1023 (1908) (Fell, J.).
320. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
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the Vermont court once stated, "incompetent and immaterial testimony is offered, with knowledge of its character, and for the purpose
of prejudicing the jury ...

."

the lawyer's conduct is "such an offense

against orderly procedure and good practice that it constitutes reversible error."3 21 This is the myth of good faith. If all of the elements
of intentional misconduct are met-improper evidence or conduct,
guilty knowledge and mens rea-the sanction is justified. The anomaly
is that, once the-case against the lawyer is established, the punishment
is visited on his client; and, despite the amount of prejudice involved,
if the improper appeal to the jury is engaged in innocently, the injured
litigant must suffer it, protected only by the unlikely satisfaction he
322
enjoys in knowing that the heart of his opponent's lawyer is pure.

Some courts have been surprisingly candid about the use of reversal
as a sanction for unethical advocacy. "It is only wilful and intentional
misconduct of an attorney," the Oregon court said, "that carries the
penalty of a mistrial." 323 Persistent and illicit passion in jury speeches,
the Illinois court said, "is, of itself, sufficient reason for granting a
new trial. 3 24 On the other hand, a little bit of prejudice is not
enough for mistrial, provided there attaches to it the benefit of the
doubt that bench should accord to bar. Even though any mention of
liability insurance, for instance, is something jurors attend to and
remember, 325 a mistrial is improper if the lawyer's mention of it is
casual or inadvertent as distinguished from "artful rather than art25
less."3
"[I]mproper questions are sometimes asked in good faith, without
any sinister motive,"327 to be sure, but the effect on the mind of the
321. Paul v. Drown, 108 Vt. 458, 461-62, 189 Atl. 144, 146 (1937).
322. Ibid.; Foster v. Sheperd, 258 Ill. 164, 101 N.E. 411 (1913).
323. Dermody v. Fanning, 153 Ore. 392, 394, 56 P.2d 1150, 1151 (1936). But see Skeeters
v. Skeeters, 389 P.2d 313, 327 (Ore. 1964):
but to insure
The granting of a mistrial on this ground is not to punish counsel .
the defendant an unprejudiced determination of his liability.
In Walker v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 155 Tex. 617, 622, 291 S.W.2d 298, 302 (1956),
the court said reversal was not justified by misconduct unless the misconduct "caused the
jury to return a different verdict."
324. Bale v. Chicago Junction Ry., 259 Ill. 476, 480, 102 N.E. 808, 809 (1913).
325. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 N EB. L. Rav. 744 (1959);
in 30 trials conducted in the Chicago jury project, and reported by Professor Broeder:
(a) when insurance was mentioned without objection or furor, the average verdict was
$37,000; (b) when the defendant said he had no insurance, the average verdict was
$33,000; (c) when the defendant said he had insurance, and there was an objection entered,
and the court instructed the jurors to disregard insurance, the average verdict was $46,000.
326. William Cameron Co. v. Downing, 147 S.W.2d 963, 966 (rex. Civ. App. 1941).
327. State v. Gadbois, 89 Iowa 25, 33, 56 N.W. 272, 275 (1893); the defendant in that
case, as he whiled away his prison sentence, must have taken great comfort in the fact
that, although improper questions may have caused the jury to put him in jail, the asker
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laymen called from the street to find the truth, on competent evidence,
may well be the same as if they were asked from the blackest motive.
The relevant causal relation is too often one between reversals of civil
judgments and the more orderly conduct of trials on the one hand, and
between unethical behavior and prejudiced verdicts on the other. In
Tennessee, for instance, there is apparently a solidified appellate rule
that insurance questions on voir dire do not raise material for mistrial
if they are asked in good faith, but that the "usual questions" asked
in bad faith, or persisted in after objection, justify mistrial-and this
is quite aside from the amount of prejudice the conduct probably
328
produces in the minds of the jurors.

Most of the appellate use of reversal and mistrial as a sanction for
bad advocacy is more subtle than Tennessee's voir dire insurance
rule. Typically comment on these sanctions is confined to dicta
in opinions to the effect that only "calculated" impropriety is bad
enough to justify mistrial, or so bad that therapeutic instructions will
not cure it.329 Suggestions of liability insurance in an accident case,
or of workmen's compensation in an employee's negligence action
against a third party, if they are engaged in ignorantly or casually, are
considered less serious than suggesting that the opposing litigant is
associated with the Mafia.33 0 And this is not because the estimated
effect of insurance is less potent than the estimated effect of organized
crime, but because it is less likely that an irrelevant fact is mentioned
with a pure motive.
Another crystallization of good faith is the "color of right" ruleif the lawyer injects prejudice into the record under a color of right,
the sanction of reversal is not justified (regardless of what the jury
thinks). The whole business of good faith puts a premium on daring;
the "color of right" refinement puts a "premium on ignorance. In
Burnett v. Bledsoe, for example, the Alabama court had before it this
of the questions acted without malice. See also Cook v. Latimer, 274 Ala. 283, 147 So. 2d
831 (1962); Schaefer v. Noble, 18 App. Div. 2d 962, 238 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1963).
328. Swift v. Wimberly, 370 S.W.2d 500 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963); Woods v. Meacham, 46
Tenn. App. 711, 333 S.W.2d 567 (1959); see also Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761 (1949); Walker,
The Problem of Indemnity Insurance in Damage Actions as Answered by the Courts of
California, 11 So. CAL. L. REv. 407 (1938).
329. Price v. King, 122 N.W.2d 318 (Iowa 1963); Stewart v. Hilton, 247 Iowa 988, 77
N.W.2d 637 (1956); Swanson v. Evans Oil Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 875, 209 N.Y.S.2d 860
(1961); G., C. & S.F. Ry. v. Levy, 59 Tex. 542 (1883).
330. McCandless v. Manzella, 369 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. 1963); see Moniz v. Bettencourt, 24
Cal. App. 2d 718, 76 P.2d 535 (1938); Clark v. Picdillo, 75 N.J. Super. 123, 182 A.2d 381
(Super. CL, App. Div. 1962); Perry v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 136 N.J.L. 398, 56
A.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Brown v. Parker, 375 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Stygles v.
Ellis, 123 N.W.2d 348 (S.D. 1963); Gianini v. Cerini, 100 Wash. 687, 171 Pac. 1007 (1918);
Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 826 (1964).
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question in a personal injury case: "Mr. Edgar, do you recall Reubin
Burnett saying there at the scene to Laverne Bledsoe, 'Don't worry
about it I have $10,000 worth of insurance?' "331 The excuse for that
question was that it bore on the sanity of the defendant Burnett. That
was sufficient color of right for the Alabama Supreme Court, which
32
affirmed a verdict for exactly $10,000. In Stygles v. Ellis,=
the court

warned the plaintiff's lawyer, in chambers, not to mention the fact
that an impeaching statement had been taken by an insurance adjuster;
the warning was circumvented by repeated reference to "a person that
must remain anonymous," and that proved to be enough good faith
to avoid reversal.
Sometimes the color of right doctrine has solidified into a rule
of trial practice. In New Jersey cases involving workmen's claims
against third parties, it was, for 15 years, permissible to raise the fact
of workmen's compensation from the worker's employer because that
information was relevant to the plaintiff's inclination to return to
work.83 3 In a 1962 opinion, the New Jersey court prospectively repudiated the rule, but found a justified color of right in the record
before it. 8 34 (Of course, if an insurance company is a proper party,

reference to it is unavoidable, whatever conjecture that may produce
in the minds of jurors. 33 5)

There is probably no more persuasive indication of the weight appellate judges have placed on the illegitimate issue of good faith than the
fact that the traditional bars to reversal-absence of objection and
therapeutic instruction-have been frequently abandoned or ignored
in cases involving prejudice plus mens rea. Effective control over prejudice is for the lawyer and not for the judge, and it is logical to conclude
that therapeutic instructions frequently will not cure the prejudice
resulting from the lawyer's shortcomings. There are cases which recognize this, but conclude that the instruction is inefficacious only where
the lawyer acts with an impure heart.,3 3 6 In other words, admonition
831. 159 So. 2d 841, 842 (Ala. 1964).
332. 123 N.W.2d 348 (S.D. 1963).
333. Perry v. Public Serv. Coordinated Transp., 136 N.J.L. 398, 56 A.2d 617 (Sup. Ct.
1948).
334. Clark v. Piccillo, 75 N.J. Super. 123, 182 A.2d 381 (Super. Ct., App. Div. 1962).
335. Price v. King, 122 N.W.2d 318 (Iowa 1963).
336. C. M. Spring Drug Co. v. United States, 12 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1926); United States
v. Jones, 32 Fed. 569 (D.S.C. 1887); Bale v. Chicago Junction Ry., 259 Ill. 476, 102 N.E.
808 (1913); Swanson v. Evans Oil Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 875, 209 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1961); Nash v.
Hiller, 380 P.2d 77 (Okla. 1963); Houston v. Pettigrew, 353 P.2d 489 (Okla. 1960);
Kloppenburg v. Kloppenburg, 66 S.D. 174, 280 N.W. 209 (1938); Conwell v. Milwaukee
Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 298, 120 N.W.2d 68 (1963); Schober v. City of Milwaukee,
18 Wis. 2d 591, 119 N.W.2d 316 (1963); Smith v. Russ, 22 Wis. 439 (1868).
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from the trial judge cures prejudice if the lawyer involved acts either
innocently or under claim of right, but it does not work if he acts with
calculated desire to prejudice.
The same distinction frequently arises in cases where the appellate
court could refuse reversal because the party injured by prejudice did
not make a record. 337 Although some of these opinions justify the
distinction by saying that objection is not necessary because a ruling on
the objection would not cure the prejudice,3 38 most of them do not
bother to explain why it is that absence of objection prevents reversal
except where bad faith appears in the conduct of the appellee's
8 39
lawyer.
When good faith in the advocate is made the determinative issue
on appeal, a question of primary importance is the means appellate
judges use to determine the presence or absence of good faith. Generally the cases fall into one of two categories, those in which the
opinions either state or imply that bad faith is an unavoidable conclusion from the record, and those in which the opinion-writer concludes that bad faith is not an unavoidable conclusion from the record
and that the advocate should be given the benefit of a doubt. In other
words (to relate this specific finding process to the basic issue involved
in this sort of appeal), if the lawyer has acted so clearly or so repeatedly
that the appellate judge cannot avoid the conclusion that his motives
were corrupt, then the lawyer's client must suffer the expense and
risk of a new trial, and the opposing lawyer's client gets a second
chance. If the appellee's lawyer, on the other hand, acted innocently,
or under claim of right, or if his conduct was so ambiguous that good
faith is a tenable conclusion, his client avoids the expense and risk of
a new trial and the opposing lawyer's client suffers the consequence
of what might be a prejudiced verdict. These opinions often do not
deny the verdict may have been prejudiced. They merely say (hold?)
that, prejudice or not, the absence of bad faith on the record is enough
to justify affirming.
Typically the opinions in the first category above conclude that the
lawyer involved could not have acted as he did if he had good motives.3 49 This may be because a series of isolated incidents-any one
337. Gordon v. Checker Taxi Co., 334 Ill. App. 313, 79 N.E.2d 632 (1948). Contra,
Kantor v. Ash, 215 Md. 285, 137 A.2d 661 (1958).
338. Cook v. Latimer, 274 Ala. 283, 147 So. 2d 831 (1962); Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa
114, 21 N.W.2d 311 (1946).
339. Klotz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 267 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 877
(1959); Ryan v. Monson, 53 Ill. App. 2d 406, 179 N.E.2d 449 (1961).
340. E.g., Paul v. Drown, 108 Vt. 458, 189 Atl. 144 (1937).
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of which appears innocent--demonstrate bad motive when viewed
cumulatively. In William Cameron Co. v. Downing,3 4 1 for instance, a
lawyer made repeated references to liability insurance, any one of
which might have been taken to be inadvertent. In Foster v. Shepherd3 42 where prejudicial conduct occurred on a retrial, and it was
the same kind of conduct which occurred the first time the case was
tried, the appellate judges reversed. More commonly, courts only
discuss the issue in passing, characterizing the conduct of the lawyer
343
below as having had an "obvious purpose," and that a bad one,
or as having had "the apparent purpose of gaining a prejudicial advantage rather than simply to bring the position of the witnesses into
proper perspective and relationship." 344 Often the impropriety is obvioi4s. In Swanson v. Evans Oil, Inc., the court thought the lawyer
had propounded a question "which he must be assumed to know
cannot be properly answered" 34 5 (in that case a question of workmen's
compensation coverage in a suit against a non-employer tort-feasor).
A recent civil assault and battery case contained this fatal exchange:
Mr. Yonke: I wonder if we have the Mafia running all through
this case.
Mr. Russell: I object and ask the jury to disregard the remark
of counsel pertaining to the Mafia.
The Court: If46 the jury heard any such remark they will disregard it.3
If the record is more ambiguous than this, the usual disposition is to
refuse a finding of bad faith. Lawyers usually can press their advantage
before a jury "to the verge of indiscretion" and avoid the finding of
"wilful and intentional misconduct."3 47
The kernel of common sense in this rule of sanction is that the
power to control prejudice effectively more often resides in the lawyer
than in the judge. "[E]rrors which have a long and dishonorable
tradition in jury trials"3 48 are usually the product of calculated campaigns of prejudice, and striking the lawyer in the pocketbook might
be an effective way to stop them, not because of professional idealism,
but because the kind of judicial waste illustrated by the Cline case is
341. 147 S.W.2d 963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
342. 258 Ill. 164, 101 N.E. 411 (1918).
843. Schaefer v. Noble, 18 App. Div. 2d 962, -, 238 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (1968).
344. Guardado v. Navarro, 47 Ill. App. 2d 92, -, 197 N.E.2d 469, 474 (1964).
345. 12 App. Div. 2d 875, -, 209 N.Y.S.2d 860, 862 (1961).
346. McCandless v. Manzella, 369 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Mo. 1963).
347. Santee v. Haggart Constr. Co., 202 Minn. 361, 363, 278 N.W. 520, 521 (1938);
Dermody v. Fanning, 153 Ore. 392, 394, 56 P.2d 1150, 1151 (1936).
348. Durkin v. Lewitz, 3 Ill. App. 2d 481, 495, 123 N.E.2d 151, 158 (1954).
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something a busy, accident-prone society cannot afford. If lawyers are
brought to responsibility, by any means, the situation will improve.
The trouble is that the assumption is unrealistic. Visiting the sins of
lawyers on their clients has not improved the level of trial advocacy
(if the number of appeals and of appellate opinions involving misconduct by lawyers is any indication). A trial lawyer who consistently
practices questionable trial tactics can afford the risk better than his
client can. In the Cline case, for instance, the appellant recovered
$30,000, despite defense conduct which the appellate court found to
be prejudicial. It was undoubtedly a difficult decision-something
Cline's lawyer called "the long draw"-to appeal that verdict and
ask for a new trial on the issue of damages. Improper conduct in that
case could have paid off for the defendants; over a trial lawyer's
career, it may pay off frequently enough that the unethical trial
lawyer can well afford an occasional loss. The pity is that clients can
win or lose only once; and courts sit to do justice for clients. 84
Appellate courts are disposed only occasionally to use the sanction
of mistrial or reversal as an instrument for disciplining lawyers when
the record does not manifest prejudice. In most cases prejudice is fairly
clear on the record; reversal for new trial is a just result. The injustice
occurs when one reflects that reversal probably would not have occurred if the lawyer's motives-not his conduct-had been a little
purer, or at least a little more ambiguous, than they were. (Occasionally, courts have deferred to a trial judge's determination of good or
bad faith; this might occur more often than it does if trial judges
made a record on the point.35°)
A substantial number of reported opinions have rejected outright
the good-faith measure for determining whether a new trial should
be ordered, and an even more substantial number have stated that
good faith, although relevant, is not something that can be considered
without also considering the possibility of* prejudice. This sort of
opinion often includes criticism of the lawyer involved or stern
lectures on the duties of trial advocates.351 Gases often contain a terse if
not cryptic statement that reversal is not justified in the absence of prejudice, regardless of what the lawyer did,352 hinting that bad faith
makes a better case for reversal than good faith does. 353 These courts
349. The Cline case is discussed in Part I-B, supra.
350. Stewart v. United States, 211 Fed. 41 (9th Cir. 1914); State v. Gadbois, 89 Iowa 25,
56 N.W. 272 (1893).
351. Henry v. Huff, 143 Pa. 548, 22 Ad. 1046 (1891).
352. Burnett v. Bledsoe, 159 So. 2d 841 (Ala. 1964); Indian Ref. Co. v. Crain, 280 Ky.
112, 132 S.W.2d 750 (1939).
353. Woods v. Meacham, 46 Tenn. App. 711, 333 S.W.2d 567 (1959).
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would not go as far, in other words, as the broad principles stated by
Mr. Justice Rutledge would require:
To weigh the error's effect against the entire setting of the record
without relation to the verdict or judgment would be almost to
work in a vacuum .... The question is, not were they right in
their judgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict. It is rather what effect the error had or reasonably may be
taken to have had on the jury's decision. The crucial thing is the
impact of the thing done wrong on the minds of other men....
The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is
rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence.3 54
Bad faith is not altogether irrelevant, but it never should be enough,
355
standing by itself, to justify reversal.
A smaller group of courts appear to have gone all the way. These
courts have rejected the idea that the state of a lawyer's conscience
is relevant in deciding whether the appellant was deprived of a fair
trial. (In this sense, the term appealing party should include appellees
who are defending a trial judge's decision granting a new trial.) "[I] n
the conduct of a trial this court is concerned with the question of
whether or not the defeated party received a fair trial," was the guide
set in Illinois in 1953, 35 and the guide appears to have had a certain
lasting effect. 5 (But even in that case, the court said, bad faith
conduct on the part of the lawyer raised a presumption of an unfair
trial, justifying reversal "unless it can be seen that it did not result
in injury."3 8 ) The Iowa court, as long ago as 1946, stated that it did
not consider bad conduct enough to justify a new trial, but would
require an affirmative showing of prejudice. The court ominously
added that it had machinery available to deal with erring lawyers.359
Probably the most two-fisted rejection of the good-faith test in
354. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946).
355. See Fields v. Creek, 21 Wis. 2d 562, 124 N.W.2d 599 (1963), especially the dissenting
opinion at 124 N.W.2d 605; and Cook v. Latimer, 274 Ala. 283, 147 So. 2d 831 (1962);
McCandless v. Manzella, 369 S.W.2d 188 (Mo. 1963). See also Huffman v. Heagy, 159
So. 2d 907 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Conwell v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 19 Wis. 2d
298, 120 N.W.2d 68 (1963).
356. 414 Ill. 210, 214, 111 N.E.2d 142, 144 (1953).
357. Bulleri v. Chicago Transit Authority, 41 I1. App. 2d 95, 190 N.E.2d 476 (1963);
Shafer v. Northside Inn, Inc., 44 I1. App. 2d 86, 194 N.E.2d 5 (1963); Roberts v. Hyland
Builders Corp., 34 IIl. App. 2d 276, 181 N.E.2d 197 (1962); Jacobson v. National Dairy
Prods. Corp., 32 Il. App. 2d 37, 176 N.E.2d 551 (1961); see Wilczewski v. American Cent.
Ins. Co., 339 Ill.
App. 576, 90 N.E.2d 569 (1950); cf. 4 JoNFS, EVIDENCE 1679 (Gard ed.
1958).
358. 414 Ill. 210, 214, 111 N.E.2d 142, 144 (1953).
359. Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa 114, 21 N.W.2d 311, 319 (1946).
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reviewing prejudice came this year from the Supreme Court of Oregon.
In Skeeters v. Skeeters, the court had before it the common question of
liability insurance, and a demand for reversal because the plaintiff had
injected that issue into the case. "The granting of a mistrial on this
ground," the court said, "is not to punish counsel for having asked
an improper question but to insure the defendant an unprejudiced
determination of his liability."3 60 Not only that, the court said, but the
determination of the question ought to rest in the normal case with the
trial judge.
In this discussion, the issue of good faith is distinct from the issue
of impact; but good faith sometimes can be bound up in the impact
that a prejudicial fact or assertion has on jurors. In Illinois, for
instance, the supreme court has developed the crystallized rule that
improper mention of a murder victim's family vitiates the conviction
of an accused murderer. This court recently recognized that the impact
information has on the jury may vary with the amount of certitude
with which it is presented. Family facts, if "elicited incidentally," may
not have the impact on the jury that the same information would have
when "presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it is
material."3 61 This is not really an issue of good faith conduct at all;
it is a matter of impact, measured according to the force with which
an improper fact is presented to the jury. 62 Alternatively, if impact
is made the test, appellate courts probably will have to recognize that
patently prejudicial tactics may produce a reverse effect on the jury;
juries might develop their own means of dealing with unethical
3 63

lawyers.

2. Direct Discipline of the Bar
To say that bad faith ought not to be relevant in deciding whether
an appealing litigant has been deprived of a fair trial hardly is to
approve the conduct itself. It is merely an argument for a more effective
means of dealing with the bad conduct. Reversals are demonstrably
ineffective in reducing it. The conduct which has produced this line
of cases almost always violates the canons of ethics promulgated by the
nationally-organized profession. It also violates specific articles in the
360. 389 P.2d 313, 327 (Ore. 1964).
361. People v. Bernette, 30 Ill. 2d 359, -, 197 N.E.2d 436, 443 (1964).
362. Bulleri v. Chicago Transit Authority, 41 Ill. App. 2d 95, 190 N.E.2d 476 (1963);
Durkin v. Lewitz, 3 Ill. App. 2d 481, 123 N.E.2d 151 (1954); Biniakiewicz v. Wojtasik, 339
Ill. App. 574, 90 N.E.2d 568 (1950).
363. Amandes, in From Voir Dire to Verdict Through a Juror'sEyes, 9 PRAC. LAW. 21
(No. 6, 1963), indicates that he believes this to have been the case with a series of jury
deliberations in which he participated.
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recently-propounded Code of Trial Conduct of the American College
of Trial Lawyers. 64 Several of the devices which have produced the
appellate literature discussed above are expressly condemned in Article
20 of this document:
(a) In the voir dire examination of the jury a lawyer should not
state or allude to any matter not relevant to the case or which
he is not in a position to prove by admissible evidence.
(c) A lawyer should never misstate the evidence or state as fact
any matter not in evidence ....
(d) A lawyer should not include in the content of any question
the suggestion of any matter which is obviously inadmissible
or which he knows is untrue.
(g) A lawyer should not ask improper questions or attempt to get
before the jury evidence which is improper. In all cases in
which he has any doubt about the propriety of any disclosure
to the jury a request should be made for leave to approach
the bench and obtain a ruling out of the jury's hearing, either
by propounding the question and obtaining a ruling or by
making an offer of proof.
Courts have the equipment for dealing with lawyers who violate
these principles, and some recent authority demonstrates an all-too-rare
awareness of this fact. 65 The Alaska Supreme Court last year criticized
one of its trial judges for his failure to control misconduct, and suggested that he try to effect control through "disciplinary action by the
court and imposition of costs in the event of mistrial. 's66 Justice
Musmanno of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania devoted a substantial
part of a 1962 opinion on jury prejudice to fatherly criticism of a
young lawyer who showed inadequate respect for one of his elder
brothers; 67 his opinion obviously proceeds from the assumption that
public correction of members of the Bar is probably a more effective
remedy for misconduct than punishment of clients. The Supreme Court
of Illinois was even more blunt, in a 1956 opinion, suggesting that
364. AMERIcAN BAR ASs'N, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 25,
29, 32; AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCr (1963), reprinted
at 32 JoUR. BAR Ass'N KAN. 117 (1963-64).
365. Skeeters v. Skeeters, 389 P.2d 313 (Ore. 1964); Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa 114,
21 N.W.2d 311 (1946). Not all of this vigor is new; see Saxton v. Pittsburg Rys., 219 Pa.
492, 68 Ad. 1022 (1908).
366. Ridgeway v. North Star Terminal & Stevedoring Co., 378 P.2d 647, 650 (Alaska
1963); see Burnett v. Hernandez, 263 F.2d 212 (9th Cir. 1959); Martin v. Dretsch, 234 Ore.
138, 380 P.2d 788 (1963).
367. LobaIzo v. Varoli, 409 Pa. 15, 185 A.2d 557 (1962).
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the offender be given fine or jail sentence for his misconduct. 6 The
Wisconsin court has suggested that a strong rebuke, in the presence of
the jury, might do more to slow the lawyer down, and to cure the effect
of prejudicial conduct, than the customary therapeutic instruction. 6 9
The Supreme Court of Iowa, opining last year that "in the administration of justice truth is more effective than mystery,"8 70 joined the

Wisconsin judges in favoring explanations to the jury in an attempt
to stop prejudice and reduce its effect. A right of reply in the offended
party is another means of dealing with prejudice, although one that
37
probably does more harm than good. '
Most of these suggestions for dealing with errant lawyers have more
merit than the Draconian penchant appellate judges have for making
clients suffer the consequences of what their lawyers do. Certainly not
all of the recent literature on this subject is depressing. Much of itthe Oregon opinion in the Skeeters case, for instance, and the Illinois
cases which have followed Crutchfield v. Meyer$72-- is realistic, and
therefore encouraging to any rational effort to deal with prejudicial
trial conduct. Neither judges nor anyone else this side of heaven can
prevent the risk a citizen takes in choosing his lawyer, but there has
to be some effort by judges to direct purgatives at the real cause of
prejudiced verdicts-the errant lawyer. No court is without ample
power to discipline its bar, and no court need penalize clients in
doing it.
IV.

CONCLUSION: UNUSED RESOURCES

It is only when principle is ... realized as a living and necessary

-thing, with as clear a pedigree and explanation as a horse or a king,
that it can become really a part of the lawyer's thought and judgment and professional equipment.
Woo draw Wilson 8s
The preservation of fair trial in civil cases depends in the first
instance on a disciplined and ethical Bar. The fact that most lawyers
368. Eizerman v. Behn, 9 Ill. App. 2d 263, 182 N.E.2d 788 (1956).
369. Sullivan v. Collins, 107 Wis. 291, 83 N.W. 310 (1900). But see Hamilton v. Harrison,
126 Kan. 188, 268 Pac. 119 (1928). This theory has its weakness-which the Kansas court
recognized-in the danger -to the client which might come from openly rebuking his
lawyer. See also Amandes, supra note 563; and White v. Crow, 198 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. 1964).
370. Price v. King, 122 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Iowa 1965). See also Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78 (1955); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 250-51 (Sd ed. 1940).
371. Cook v. Latimer, 274 Ala. 283, 147 So. 2d 831 (1962); Eizerman v. Behn, 9 Ill.
App. 2d 265, 132 N.E.2d 788 (1956); Brabeck v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 117 N.W.2d 921
(Minn. 1962); 1 WGMORE, EViDENCE 250-351 (3d ed. 1940).
872. 414 Ill.
210, 111 N.E.2d 142 (1955).
373. Legal Education of Undergraduates,17 A.B.A. RP. 439, 445-46 (1894).
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are eligible for membership in that kind of Bar is obvious from the
ideals they daily expound and defend; the Canons of Ethics of the
American Bar Association and the Code of Trial Conduct of the
American College of Trial Lawyers are two potent pieces of evidence
to prove this. But many lawyers, possibly from a lack of professional
independence, are too immersed in victory to respect their commitment
to the fair and effective administration of justice. The profession is
able to deal with this small number of its members, but it has rarely
even attempted to do so. How many bar association disciplinary proceedings are brought for flagrant abuse of the tribunals of justice? How
many could be brought? In this area of self-discipline (and one of the
essential ingredients of any profession is self-discipline) the profession
is failing to perform its duty.
To the extent that the organized profession fails to exact honorable
trial conduct from the few lawyers disposed to erode the dignity of
the courts, the remedy must come primarily from trial judges. Here
again, -though, there is unused power and unmet responsibility. Every
trial judge has contempt power; every trial judge can suspend erring
members of his bar from practice; every trial judge can recommend
action against disrespectful lawyers by appropriate bar association
committees. Too few trial judges attempt to exact honorable conduct
from lawyers. More may, as judicial tenure reforms gain ground, and
as the possibility diminishes of an able judge losing his post when his
political party has a bad year. There is, fortunately, a growing demand
from appellate courts, in their supervisory capacities, that trial judges
be more active in assuring the fair conduct of litigation.
Certainly not all prejudice comes into trial records through misconduct. Even for inadvertent prejudice, the trial judge often has
unused remedies. The pretrial conference, for instance, is rarely used
in many state courts in spite of the fact that pretrial conferences, and,
to a lesser extent, motions before trial to suppress evidence and strike
pleadings, and motions at the bench during trial to avoid prejudice
contain enormous potential for the prevention of prejudicial verdicts.
A pretrial order, finally, provides a sure guideline for the conduct of
advocates and adequate ground for stern discipline from the bench if
pretrial directives are ignored.
In one of his peerless studies on class gifts, Dean A. James Casner
concluded that:
Some of the precedents established and followed are subject to
criticism. But on the whole the courts have done a remarkable
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piece of work in the light of the mess that has been made of the
job of draftsmanship.3 74
Somewhat the same sentiment must occur to the reader in connection
with the work of appellate courts dealing with prejudiced verdicts.
They operate, and have always operated, with great handicaps. They
receive in most cases a problem that could have been corrected, or
prevented, by honorable conduct from the advocates in the case and
alert conduct from the trial judge. They propound fictions in dealing
with their work, but they do this only because time and space forbid
the careful correction of (to paraphrase Dean Casner) the mess that
has been made of the job of trialmanship. While they probably have
been seriously unrealistic in the bad faith cases, this unrealism is mitigated by the fact that appellate judges recognize a disciplined bar as
the first essential of fair trial. They recognize that they are in a poor
position to impose the discipline that the organized bar and the trial
bench should have imposed before the case came to trial, and at each
moment of the trial.
"The whole legal profession is pre-eminently a manly one," Sir
James Stephen said. "It is a calling in which success is impossible to
the weak or timid, and in which everyone, judge or barrister, is expected to do his duty without fear or favor to the best of his ability
and judgment." 87 5 There is, it seems to me, some of Stephen's challenge
hidden in the prejudiced verdict cases.
374. Casner, Class Gift to Others than to "Heirs" or "Next of Kin"--Increased in the
Class Membership, 51 HAv. L. REv. 254, 308 (1937).
375. Quoted in STRYxER, Foa TiH D.Es'zNSE 120 (1947).

